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Leaders of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must contend 
with multiple accountability regimes while balancing responsibilities to stakeholders.  
While many accountability mechanisms are donor-led, this study sought to understand 
the capacity that NGOs have as agents of change to influence measurement and 
evaluations activities.  The study focused on NGO applications submitted to a donor-
government during competitive award announcements for conventional weapons 
destruction activities. 
Using a parallel convergent mixed methods approach, this study examined the 
ways in which NGO leaders develop their organizations’ capacity to implement long-
term impact assessments.  A direct entry logistic regression of applications showed 
evidence of organizational characteristics influencing the inclusion of such assessment 
activities in response to a stated donor-government objective.  Textual analysis of these 
applications helped build a more robust understanding of how the community of practice 
proposed to develop and deploy impact assessments.   
 This study found a field engaged in active conversation about measuring impact 
and highlights the changing power dynamics in the traditional donor/NGO relationship. 
Opportunities for future research and limitations of the study are discussed.  The results 
of the investigation have important implications for researchers and practitioners in the 
field, including ways NGO leaders can use a collaborative process to demonstrate 
accountability, improve strategic planning, develop internal capacity, and substantiate 
impact.   
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Leading from the Field – International nongovernmental organizations and the 
participatory development of long-term impact assessments 
 
Introduction 
Leadership is intrinsically linked with accountability; accountability requires 
measurement and evaluation.  This study examined the ways in which leaders at 
nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations develop capacity and implement long-term 
impact assessments.  With increased calls for accountability, leaders are under significant 
pressure to respond to external and internal stakeholders.  This presents a tension—and 
opportunity—for leaders to manage.   
Questions about how organization leaders respond to these challenges start with 
governance and structure (Tran, 2019) but continue to stakeholder engagement and 
mission focus (Valean, Eynaud, Chatelain-Ponroy & Sponem, 2018).  To balance these 
stakeholders while simultaneously meeting donor requirements and delivering services, 
leaders are called upon not only to improve management but also to diversify such 
strategies (Laurett & Ferreira, 2018).  Similarly, research in the nonprofit sector and 
contemporary dialogues underscore the need for proactive leadership that diversifies 
resources and increases capacity (Lee & Shon, 2018; Hung & Hager, 2019).   
This study recognizes the inherent struggles in the structure of the donor-
government/nonprofit organization relationship.  As will be discussed, leaders must 
address resource dependence within a challenging alliance (Knutsen, 2017).  But research 
has shown that the tension between donor-governments and nonprofit organizations also 
generates creativity and affirms a nonprofit’s identity (Arvidson, 2018).  As this study 
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will discuss, increased accountability and evaluation are a reality for the nonprofit sector; 
however, leaders can show concern for organization identity and mission drift while 
simultaneously evaluating and improving services (Atia & Herrold, 2018).  The vision, 
capacity, and energy to tackle these competing priorities and challenges are critical to 
nonprofit longevity—and are critical for leaders to understand as they manage 
stakeholders, increase transparency and accountability, and solicit resources to deliver 
services.  All of these factors and complications are magnified in scale and scope for 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), many of which work across 
borders and can be delivering services in post-conflict or near-conflict spaces. 
Post-conflict Weapons Destruction.  Landmines, unexploded ordnance, explosive 
remnants of war, and stockpiles of conventional weapons pose a challenge to peace and 
prosperity around the world.  Removing these explosive hazards and improving weapons 
security and destruction capacities pave the way for stabilization and development in 
transitional and post-conflict spaces.  The first concerted, semi-professional work in this 
direction started in the late-1980s as a local endeavor of necessity in South Asian 
communities impacted by landmines and other explosive hazards.  The Conventional 
Weapons Destruction (CWD) community of practice has since grown into a highly 
standardized and technically proficient global capacity for response and remediation.  
The growth and development of the landmine action community of practice largely 
emulates the professionalization of the international development assistance sector.   
The U.S. Department of State now manages approximately $250 million in annual 
funding to support landmine clearance and CWD programs around the world.  Working 
with foreign governments, international organizations, private companies, and NGOs, 
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these projects support the reduction of excess small arms and light weapons and 
conventional ammunition, implements physical security and stockpile management 
practices at weapons storage sites, and supports humanitarian mine action programs to 
remove other explosive hazards.  These projects work through a variety of grants, 
cooperative agreements, and contracts to international NGOs, public international 
organizations, and private firms to carry out the broad portfolio of CWD activities. 
CWD programs continue to evolve in response to new challenges.  Implementing 
partners are adapting interventions to Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan—countries 
with active armed conflicts—while also meeting overarching humanitarian missions.  
Stabilization and other humanitarian assistance efforts cannot begin until key sites are 
cleared of explosive hazards; so, it is critical that work be carried out efficiently and to 
key standards of quality.  This growth in the responsibility and influence of the NGO 
community has been broadly investigated (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998) and has had a 
profound impact on the CWD community of practice.   
The landmine action community of practice has taken a different path than other 
international development interests, at least in part because of its technical nature and 
adherence to best practices.  The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) address all 
aspects of active operations and help ensure that landmine clearance and other activities 
in multiple contexts result in land cleared of explosive hazards to an acceptable level of 
risk and accepted level of confidence.  The IMAS define landmine action as those 
activities that seek to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impact of 
landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and other explosive hazards. They are of 
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interest to our story because they allow donors, operators, communities, and other 
stakeholders to have confidence in the clearance activities being conducted.   
The IMAS are also of interest because they define “mine action” as being broader 
than just clearance: “It is also about people and societies, and how they are affected by 
landmine and ERW contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk 
from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely” (IMAS Glossary, 
2013).  In short, the international standards link operational deliverables with 
communities’ quality of life and safety.  An overarching goal of CWD activities is to 
build indigenous capacity, so critiques of governments as donors are diffused by the 
reality on the ground for landmine clearance work.  That having been said, the IMAS are 
the minimum standards of acceptable work for the field.  Leaders of donors and NGOs 
can and should work together to use data to improve services beyond compliance. 
It should be noted here that NGOs, while “nongovernmental,” are part of and an 
outcome of a political and economic system that affects the political, regulatory, and 
operational environments for these service delivery organizations (Bloodgood, Trembley-
Boire, & Prakash, 2014).  This is particularly true for the landmine action community, 
which saw the negotiations on an international mine ban treaty championed and executed 
by NGOs first.  It was only after intense pressure from NGOs that governments became 
involved in the process that would result in the Ottawa Convention. 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and 
Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction (commonly referred to as the 
Ottawa Convention) was adopted by sovereign governments in 1997.  The convention 
grew from the efforts of six NGOs that founded the International Campaign to Ban 
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Landmines in 1992.  As Keck and Sikkink (1998) demonstrated, networks of 
international NGOs and individual leaders can take specific, discrete steps to influence 
governments and move international norms.  The trend of devolving state action to 
implementing partners for international assistance and development—the evolution of 
international collective action—was present in the genesis of the major treaties and 
frameworks governing conventional weapons destruction activities.   
Measuring Progress.  As with other donor-governments and stakeholders in the field, 
the Department of State has an interest in supporting CWD activities that provide long-
term value to communities recovering from conflict.  The non-profit sector in the United 
States, and the NGO sector globally, are well regarded for their energy, creativity, and 
focus on cost-effectiveness (Wolf, 1999).  There has been considerable attention to the 
adoption and implementation of impact assessments and other evaluation techniques by 
NGOs, often as part of overall compliance with reporting requirements (Ebrahim, 2003b).  
What has been less considered is the extent to which donor-governments can tap into the 
creative energy and cost-consciousness of the nonprofit sector to encourage the 
development of impact assessments and evaluation regimes.  In this way, donors may 
positively incentivize NGO leaders to spur the development and integration of impact 
assessments while normalizing these monitoring and evaluation techniques.  
Donor-governments often prefer to work through NGOs because they change 
faster than local governments (AbouAssi, 2012).  While this preference may be 
substantiated in practice, an emphasis on rapid response time might harm implementing 
partners.  If NGOs are expected to change behavior without sufficient notice, fluctuations 
in funding can be devastating.  As Doornbos (2003) pointed out, donors may change 
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priorities quickly while NGO leaders are left to react and decipher or interpret and 
implement these changes regardless of their organizations’ abilities, interests, and 
capacities.  This tug of war between development imperatives and institutional 
imperatives has an outsized impact on implementing partners because they may not be 
regularly involved in the process of revising donors’ priorities (Edwards, 2008). 
 While the broader humanitarian assistance community has adopted long-term 
impact assessments (LTIAs) as a way of demonstrating effectiveness and efficiency, 
there is a question about how best to encourage similar evaluations within the CWD 
community of practice.  As DePree (2004) wrote on this relationship, “The art of 
leadership requires us to think about the leader-as-steward in terms of relationships: of 
assets and legacy, of momentum and effectiveness, of civility and values” (p. 6).  If 
donor-governments are to prioritize the use of long-term assessment measures, they may 















In the relationship between donors and NGOs, there are significant documented 
incentives for NGO compliance.  Even where leaders are sensitive to power dynamics, 
the single most important way donors can influence the relationship is the provision of 
funding.  While the NGO sector is credited with creativity and innovation—especially 
with an attention to conserving scarce resources—participatory change is an important 
force in the sector (see Hinton, 2004, and Wolf, 1999).  Donors have an inherent interest 
in ensuring the impact of the interventions they fund (see Roche, 1999).  Beyond overall 
compliance (Ebrahim, 2003b), NGO leaders may be engaged to develop internal capacity 
and strategic direction as part of implementing assessment and evaluation regimes.  The 
opportunity to do so recognizes the pragmatism of NGO leaders balancing donor intent, 
organizational capacity, service quality, and effectiveness (DePree, 2004).   
Evaluations establish legitimacy (Ebrahim, 2005).  But, as the literature 
documents, a problem with accountability mechanisms is the chance they negatively 
affect service delivery.  The challenge facing NGO leaders is how to respond to donor-
government requirements for measurement and evaluation practices while building on 
internal organizational characteristics such as creativity, energy, and cost-consciousness.  
The momentum and effectiveness DePree (2004) recognizes for leaders is related no just 
to spotting trends and adapting but also to thinking strategically about coopting donor-
government references or requirements while building capacity and transforming their 
organizations.    
Given their intractable position in the realm of foreign affairs, governments are 
critical donors in international development and conflict recovery.  Donor attitudes 
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toward development aid and donors’ beliefs toward poverty and vulnerable populations 
suggest a limit toward warm glow giving (see Andreoni, 1990), at least for institutional 
donors working within the international development realm (Bachke, Alfnes, & Wik, 
2014).   Where Andreoni (2007) divided the market into three—private donors, recipient 
organizations, and governments—there has been skepticism: “For governments donating 
money to [charitable] organizations, it is important to realize that for many good causes, 
it can be very difficult to raise money from private donors” (Bachke, Alfnes, & Wik, 
2014, p. 482).   
The problem of resource mobilization for innovation is especially trenchant for 
the conventional weapons destruction community of practice.  The work undertaken for 
landmine clearance and other weapons security and destruction activities involves 
significant capital expenses. Fixed/variable expenses for operations can cost millions of 
dollars per year.  The competitive announcement process undertaken by the U.S. 
Department of State attempts, in part, to hold these costs in check—still, the work is 
resource-intensive, so the primacy of institutional or government donors is solidified by 
these significant funding requirements.  The major cost components for the CWD sector 
can quickly dwarf the funding abilities of most private donors and charitable foundations.  
As we see in the literature and in practice, governments function in two specific but 
intertwined roles in the foreign assistance space: beyond being primary interlocutors for 
international diplomacy, they are also the primary funding source for such work.   
At issue for leaders in donor-governments and NGOs is managing relationships 
while addressing the lack of long-term impact assessments—and a need to continually 
articulate value and legitimacy.  As the largest bilateral donor to CWD activities, there is 
LEADING FROM THE FIELD   
 
9 
a clear desire to implement LTIAs that demonstrate value without mandating 
requirements that disrupt service.  A lack of consensus by way of best practices or 
standards from the field is a challenge but also an opportunity—for leaders in NGOs and 
donor-governments—to strike a balance and establish a relationship.  
Based on this context, the present study asks these essential questions: Do NGOs 
develop long-term impact assessments in response to donor prompts?  If they do, are 
there organizational factors to support the inclusion of LTIAs?  And how are 
organizations proposing to implement components of LTIAs? 
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Purpose of the Study 
The present study seeks to engage with these ideas of NGO creativity and 
frugality because they have not been discussed thoroughly as part of measurement and 
evaluation within the CWD community of practice.  While leaders’ roles are recognized 
in a large body of literature on nonprofit organizations, these studies have not been 
applied to CWD activities (see Allen, Smith, & Da Dilva, 2013; Anheier, 2009; Ebrahim, 
2003b; Jaskyte, 2008; McCambridge, 2004).  Landmine action and CWD activities 
include services that are highly technical and structured; therefore, the subject experts 
and implementing partners for such service delivery would be best poised to develop 
LTIAs that can be integrated into programs with minimal disruption.  Donor leaders can 
leverage this technical expertise against a desire by implementing partners to secure 
additional funding for service delivery.   
Every year, the Department of State awards a portion of its assistance via 
competitive announcements.  NGOs apply on the basis of the terms and conditions of 
these competitions.  Many of the components of applications are mandatory, and there 
are barriers to entry for new organizations; however, some elements of the 
announcements are optional or suggested.  The full competitive process is addressed and 
an example call for proposals has been included as Appendix A.   
For the past five years, the Department has included optional language in some of 
its notices of funding opportunity that has encouraged applicants to address how they will 
develop and incorporate LTIAs during the project’s period of performance.  It is through 
these elements that grant-seeking organizations can move beyond compliance to develop 
and integrate LTIAs.  This study will use the applications received to understand the 
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ways in which NGO leaders may respond to long-term impact assessment prompts and 
distinguish their organizations’ capacities and capabilities.  Additionally, it aims to better 
understand what commonalities exist when NGO leaders develop LTIA for integration in 
their projects.   
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Review of the Literature 
To establish an appropriate body of literature, this study first reviewed the 
frameworks of international foreign assistance.  With the exception of some limited 
funding from foundations or private donors, the vast majority of funding to support 
conventional weapons destruction projects around the world comes from donor-
governments (Landmine Monitor Report, 2016).  The dynamics of international foreign 
assistance are discussed in a broad and rich body of literature, so this review of literature 
focused on theories related to power dynamics and the relationships between and 
leadership of donor-governments and the NGO community.  The study also included 
relevant literature in donor engagement, NGO capacity, and donor-NGO relationships to 
provide context for participatory models of evaluation and assessment.   
Marshall and Suarez (2013) identified a trend of increased funding opportunities 
for NGOs as governments avoided providing bilateral foreign assistance while also 
seeking to maintain influence—governments increased their interface with implementing 
partners while also devolving services because of concerns related to providing assistance 
directly to other governments.  The literature has documented these changes in the 
international assistance field and their implications for NGO leadership.  The literature 
review also considered best practices from the field, especially the research on delivering 
interventions in transitional or conflict spaces to better understand how measurement and 
evaluation regimes can be practically implemented.   
Opportunities for Leadership.  As outlined by Bryson (2004), the engaged leader 
encourages the organization to undertake strategic change, while also discussing the 
consequence of failure.  However, the engaged organization may not need such 
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statements to improve markedly—this is especially true for mission-oriented 
organizations like nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations.  That having been said, 
leaders must “achieve workable unity” (Gardner, 1990).  Transformational leadership 
(see Bass, 1985) calls for a multifaceted approach in the public sector (Van Wart, 2003).  
Behn (2004) terms this “creating the performance framework” to encourage active 
leadership from subordinates in pursuit of an organization’s mission or goals.   
Leaders within the nonprofit sector can manage a culture that promotes such 
positive activity and empowers others (George, 2007; Schein, 1996).  Leaders are 
responsible for managing the expectations of such exercises (Alaimo, 2008).  Linked with 
strategic planning or resource development, leaders can deploy internal capacity to 
address outside evaluation criteria that is mission-focused and operationalizes 
organizational characteristics like creativity and cost-consciousness.   
Default factors of leadership, management, strategy, hegemony, and 
accountability have the potential to encourage an environment in which large, opaque 
donors manage by fiat.  Instead, a collaborative process for developing and instituting 
accountability mechanisms can build on the history of the CWD community of practice.  
Understanding these factors and historical precedents, NGO leaders have the opportunity 
to adopt a balanced approach that incorporates accountability measures that satisfy donor 
demands while limiting the overall disruptive force of externally imposed evaluation 
mechanisms.  Leaders can develop clear and documented needs, communicate and 
motivate others, and ensure change and innovation are successful (see Gilley, Dixon, & 
Gilley, 2008).  While these theories have historically focused on the private sector, 
transformational and servant leadership have been successful in the public sector as well 
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(see Borins, 2002) and for leaders working across groups and constituencies (see Yip, 
Wong, & Ernst, 2008).   
Research encourages a participatory model for assessment development because it 
allows leaders to enable “those out on the margins to represent and defend their interests 
more effective, not only within their own immediate contexts but also globally” (Eade, 
2007, p. 630).  Leaders at all levels and with every stakeholder group can help their 
organizations by advocating for equity in a more participatory environment.  Studies have 
found a positive relationship between rank-and-file (that is to say lacking specialization) 
stakeholder engagement and the retention of mission focus in strategic planning 
processes (Valeau, Eynaud, Chatelain & Sponem, 2018).  The successful development 
and deployment of long-term impact assessments would make the most of the access and 
expertise of NGO leaders and answer the donor-government’s monitoring and 
accountability imperatives.   
Government Performance as Donor.  Donor-government actions and preferences can 
have long-term impacts on the development of states and service sustainability.  Batley 
and Mcloughlin (2010) examined whether non-state service delivery organizations 
threatened the legitimacy of governments.  Specifically, they explored the idea that there 
is a conflict between the goal of state building (or building effective indigenous capacity) 
and the imperative of rapid service provision.  The concern about NGOs displacing 
nascent government bodies is fair and warrants reviewing operations and guidelines for 
those working in fragile environments.  In such situations, there are few empirical studies 
on operations, firms operate with different norms, and donors are not always transparent 
on the operational evaluations of organizations they fund.  As Batley and Mcloughlin 
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(2010) wrote, service provision by non-state entities is “unregistered, unregulated, and 
unnoticed” (p. 133).   
A concern with stakeholder engagement and representation as part of service 
effectiveness pervades the literature on international development and foreign assistance.  
Campbell and Lambright (2016) considered funder and provider motivations for 
collecting project-level information by surveying how donors collected and interpreted 
program performance data.  To frame their discussion, the authors used organizational 
effectiveness and multiple constituency theories as grounding perspectives.  
Organizational effectiveness theory proposes measuring performance in light of 
management and governance (Herman & Renz, 2008); multiple consistency theory 
provides a more robust perspective than agency, resource dependence, and institutional 
theories because it focuses on learning over outcomes (Ebrahim, 2005 and 2010).  These 
theories offer an interesting framework: performance metrics can help improve 
management activities if they are linked to development, community representation, and 
long-term impact.  To this end, the authors supported fighting the desire for a single set of 
evaluation criteria (Connolly, Conlin, & Deutch, 1980, p. 212).   
As Campbell and Lambright (2016) noted, some donors collect performance 
information for their own stakeholders.  Having multiple stakeholders for performance 
measurement underscores the importance of having NGO leaders visualize donor 
governments within this broader framework—donors influence the relationship and have 
upward and downward accountability (Ebrahim, 2010, p. 102).   A collaborative process 
may move the relational experience into something more akin to a partnership.   
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Besides seeking to gain access and build partnerships with donors, research shows 
that NGO leaders must also contend with retaining funding sources or move into 
reengagement and reacquisition (Aldrich, 2000; Bell, 1992; Bennett, 2006; Bennett, 
2009).  The pressures of power dynamics and engagement are particularly heightened 
when NGO leaders attempt to reconnect with lapsed or parted donors.  In the private 
sector, firms are concerned with the most effective and efficient ways to reacquire a 
client, and there is access to client behavioral histories and other characteristics that may 
closely determine affinity (Feng, 2014).  There is obvious interest from NGO leaders in 
reacquiring previous donors, given the resources consumed when cultivating new donors.  
The literature has isolated two major factors that contribute to donor reengagement: 
regret at abandoning the organization and the appeal of a reacquisition (Bennett, 2009).  
These factors may be limited in practice, however, as Burt and Popple (1998) and Lee 
and Woodliffe (2010) noted—any survey data on (private) donors’ giving patterns and 
preferences likely reflect over-reporting on certain information deemed desirable.  While 
this survey data concerned private individual donors, institutional donors and 
governments are historically more inscrutable.  It is difficult for NGO leaders to divine 
donor intent without establishing a relationship during engagement and acquisition (or 
retention and reacquisition); this is not a passive process for successful NGO leaders. 
Feek (2007) also leveled critiques against donor-imposed standards and the idea 
of best practices, saying these have no place in a scientific study because they are not 
replicable, uniform, or true.  While this does not invalidate best practices—plenty of 
worthwhile activities do not meet such rigorous standards—the argument does highlight a 
problem with institutional donors.  Best practices are largely context-based or context-
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specific, and they can discourage diversity, experimentation, or adaptation (especially in 
a field that focuses on compliance and conformity). 
All of these factors coalesce into something of an unflattering portrait of large, 
inscrutable government donors.  If the process of developing and instituting 
accountability mechanisms could be opened to technical experts and implementing 
partners active downrange, some of these pressures and imbalances might be alleviated.  
Field personnel are active at the nearest point of operations and service delivery.  Jung, 
Kaufmann, and Harrow (2013) found evidence that foundations, frustrated with donor 
governments’ inertia, sometimes banded together to take a more substantial and direct 
role in advocating for policy changes.  Still, this response to opacity and inertia has 
limited benefit for the nonprofit sector, as it does not directly engage with the issue of 
improving the ways in which donor governments make policy decisions that affect the 
sector. 
Inscrutability of Donors.  Brown and Troutt (2004) attempted to reconcile these varied 
motivations by accounting for the actions and structures that foster a positive relationship 
between governments and NGOs.  The authors noted that there would be specific 
positions to ensure a successful relationship and specific attitudes to adopt.  As we have 
seen, outsourcing activities to NGOs makes monitoring difficult and can interfere with 
planning, coordination, and service delivery.  Donor-governments cannot create a 
positive working relationship if they “[create] standards but [do] not enforce them or if 
funding is not available to ensure that standards are met” (Brown & Troutt, 2004, p. 11).  
Such an environment presents the opportunity to adopt creative monitoring regimes that 
allow increasingly active grant recipients to work uninterrupted but with sufficient 
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oversight.  It may also promote NGO creativity and capacity while meeting donor 
objectives and fitting into existing intervention designs. 
Standards help ensure consistent products—see the International Mine Action 
Standards—and are critical when working with transient populations or amidst 
uncertainty (Brown & Troutt, 2004).  The literature supports an approach, additionally, 
where governments provide support beyond money, especially in two areas of emphasis: 
structure and attitude.   Structural components are duplicable—standards should be 
executed on grants or cooperative agreements with clear communication between 
stakeholders.  Additionally, attitude and environment can affect the adoption of new 
standards and regulations by encouraging collaboration (Brown & Troutt, 2004). 
There is inherent volatility in the donor/implementer relationship, and government 
donors may prioritize political factors over broader development concerns (see Kharas, 
2004, p. 4).  Yet, as AbouAssi (2012) noted, there is still a clear preference for 
nongovernmental organizations in the international development and conflict recovery 
spheres because these actors are more responsive and customizable than large 
government initiatives.  Service delivery has also devolved to these organizations 
because, as noted, there is a lack of capacity with some host governments.  As discussed 
with the development and adoption of the Ottawa Convention, the needs of affected 
communities and the service mechanisms of NGOs coalesced long before concerned 
parties added the appeal for or sourcing of funds to the agenda.  These sector-wide best 
practices were baked into the CWD community of practice, so power dynamics are 
already inclined toward a more participatory model for monitoring and evaluation.     
LEADING FROM THE FIELD   
 
19 
Donors have the ability and prerogative to help establish a policy framework not 
only to prevent bad behavior but also to promote a stable work environment (Batley & 
Mcloughin, 2010).  As the authors note, it is especially difficult to review operations and 
guidelines while working in fragile environments.  There is a lack of empirical case 
studies, of information sharing by donors, and of consensus on goals and norms. The 
literature also expresses concern about adopting policy frameworks, which establish clear 
roles and relationships in stable environments, because they “may be unproductive in 
fragile settings where state capacity is weak” (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010, p. 173).  At 
the end of the day, the literature conceives of NGOs as strategic actors with significant 
agency when engaging and interacting with multilateral institutions, donor governments, 
and other stakeholders (Fogarty, 2011).  By balancing all of these factors with the type of 
work being done and the environments in which it is being done, there is a strong 
rationale for a participatory model of impact assessment development and deployment 
with NGO and donor-government leaders.   
Accountability and NGO Agency.  The call for increased accountability and 
achievement is the logical outcome of a nonprofit sector that is increasingly embedded in 
mainstream political or development processes (Moxham & Boaden, 2007).  NGOs 
delivering services in lieu of direct government intervention have reported a concomitant 
increase in calls for accountability (Lipsky & Smith, 1989).  This shift has happened 
along with and related to increasing calls for the nonprofit sector to adopt more private 
sector tendencies in its operations (Dart, 2004).  As previously discussed, outsourcing or 
contracting can make monitoring difficult because it is almost always externally imposed 
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and can interfere with planning, coordination, and service delivery (Brown & Troutt, 
2004).   
There is a large body of literature about accountability for international NGOs, 
and much of it helps substantiate oversight requirements.  These entities have significant 
impact in their communities of practice.  Cavill and Sohail (2007), working through the 
broad corpus, parsed NGO accountability based on its focus within particular contexts.  
Practical accountability focuses on effectiveness and efficiency, with how activities are 
performed or services are delivered.  By comparison, strategic accountability measures 
growth as it relates to an organization’s mission.  There is a frequent dichotomy drawn 
for accountability sector-wide, though Cavill and Sohail (2007) noted an emphasis on 
practical accountability during semi-structured interviews following a literature review.  
They found this focus caused organizations to overlook strategic accountability and to 
miss some gaps in practical accountability as well.  Both are important (and both are 
worth doing well), the authors contended, because accountability is linked to legitimacy, 
response to criticism, quality of practice, professionalization, and visibility.  This division 
of practical and strategic accountability helps theoretically balance the goals of NGOs to 
simultaneously deliver services and justify their existence (Ferguson, 1994). 
 Many authors make strident cases for transparency and participation when 
deploying evaluation mechanisms to prevent what Ebrahim (2005) terms “accountability 
myopia.”  An emphasis on accountability can hamper efforts to affect lasting change—
Ebrahim (2005) suggests that a strident focus can negatively affect organizational 
learning and capacity development.  Accountability systems are difficult to navigate, but 
a lack of attention to accountability can create blind spots for operations and strategy 
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(Carman & Fredericks, 2008).  The outcome is to limit capacity before leaders can 
develop it. 
Likewise, an overemphasis on accountability can prioritize funders before 
mission, vision, and theory of change—or emphasize normative impacts over long-term 
goals.  In a cluster analysis study of organizations, Carman and Fredericks (2010) found 
three types of NGO approaches to accountability: those satisfied with their evaluation 
capacity, those struggling with evaluation, and those struggling across the board with 
little support for evaluation.  Organizations most satisfied with their evaluative capacities 
and confident in their abilities to meet internal and external stakeholders’ needs were 
more likely to view evaluations as an organizational development tool as well as a 
compliance measure.   
Accountability ultimately means measuring performance (Speckbacher, 2003).  
Business models for measuring performance have been adapted to the nonprofit sector, 
and some (balanced scorecard, performance prism) explicitly mention nonprofits (see 
Moxham & Boaden, 2007 for a thorough review of studies on the applicability of 
business processes in the public and nonprofit sectors).  Most public sector entities do not 
have the latitude of the private sector.  Nonprofit and public sector leaders are sometimes 
constrained in innovating and implementing change (Liket & Maas, 2015).  Additionally, 
there are difficulties in transplanting private sector goals and public sector accountability 
to the nonprofit sector (Moxham & Boaden, 2007).   
For their part, NGO leaders have positioned their organizations as strategic actors 
and influence the bureaucracies that fund and oversee them (Fogarty, 2011).  There are 
also developmental lifecycles to contend with as we explore interactions between donors 
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and other stakeholders (Avina, 1993).  By bringing donors together with service delivery 
organizations, the literature suggests that leaders can capitalize on field expertise while 
balancing reporting requirements with practical limitations.  Research has demonstrated 
that the tension between donor requirements and nonprofit responses can confer a 
common identity and spur creativity (Arvidson, 2018).  These perspectives of 
transforming rote compliance activities help situate NGOs in a dynamic context—one in 
which leaders can engage in direct conversation with donors and stakeholders.  If we 
accept NGOs as agents in their own right, then part of our discussion must contend with 
how NGO leaders best promote the outcomes of their work. 
Metrics.  Stakeholders obviously require results to substantiate effectiveness.  The 
literature suggests that it is not sufficient to mandate measurement and assessment 
regimes—donor-governments and other stakeholders should also specify what to 
measure.  To assist, best practices emerge that help distill general guidance, past 
successes, and the requirements for a community of practice.  As they examined the 
adoption of performance evaluations by NGOs, Eckerd and Moulton (2011) also tapped 
into resource dependence theory (Froelich, 1999; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978) and 
contingency theory (Herman & Renz, 2008).  Through these lenses, overlaid with new 
and institutional theory (DiMaggio, 2001), the authors observed that organizations tended 
to parse evaluation requirements into two levels of accountability mechanisms.  At the 
organization level, the authors noted evaluations were used to signal legitimacy, as 
previously discussed; at the project level, evaluations helped link impact with the 
outcomes of service delivery.  The danger with lumping these heterogeneous factors, 
actors, and objectives together is that evaluations could assume equivalency across the 
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nonprofit sector.  The potential of improving accountability frameworks is advantageous 
at multiple levels.   
Likewise, the prospect of ill-suited evaluations prompts a discussion about 
improving accountability, from the ground up, with individual or tailored metrics and 
rules.  Burger (2012) examined oversight options and scenarios to look for ways in which 
regulators and government involvement may enhance accountability.  Using a case study 
of Ugandan nonprofits, the author found that evidence of corruption and perceptions of 
ineffectiveness tarnished organization reputations with stakeholders.  In this case, there 
was not much that could be done to significantly improve these factors—government 
regulations suffer from pool design and ineffective resource allocation (and there was not 
sufficient political pressure or peer review to overcome these deficiencies).  Burger 
(2012) did suggest, however, that some regulation and government oversight could 
promote an environment for increased accountability.   
Even with developmental NGOs that are frequently large and complex 
(sometimes reaching the size of host nations’ governments), the nonprofit sector still 
contends with operations taking place in self-made or fluid contexts.  Burger (2012) 
found that monitoring by donors faced less resistance than outright regulation and 
oversight in various situations, writing, “Because donors control significant resources, 
they have strong influence over the NGO sector and compliance is not expected to be a 
problem” (p. 95).  While the latter point is debatable, Burger’s case does suggest that 
donor involvement has a shorter time horizon and greater project focus than host 
government regulations and metrics.  This flexible time horizon could be helpful in post-
conflict or transitional spaces.  Further improvement of accountability measures and the 
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development of metrics requires us to consider the ways in which accountability can 
effectively and constructively be tailored to NGO activities and contexts.   
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) made the case that effective assistance programs 
only function if they include recipients’ perspectives.  The same could be extrapolated for 
measuring program effectiveness.  Access to decision-making processes remains 
problematic across the sector; but, incorporating stakeholder feedback can help 
substantiate organizations’ missions and persuade donors to adapt.  Donor-governments 
may not have access to beneficiary perspectives in developing areas and evaluation 
mechanisms may not have sufficient downward accountability (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2010).  Bearing this in mind—and understanding that clients and beneficiaries’ 
experiences are context-specific—making accountability mechanisms and metrics more 
participatory might offer multiple benefits.   
Discussions of accountability mechanisms must surely grapple with components 
or metrics of such regimes.  Allio (2012) suggested that strategic and thoughtful 
development and deployment of metrics by leaders could ultimately improve the 
implementation and delivery of services.  For price and value conscious donors, such a 
process offers the potential of improving project efficacy (quality of services delivered) 
and efficiency (oversight by management).  While metrics tend to focus on those 
operational efficiency goals, they can be oriented to indicators of strategic achievement, 
looking at efficiency and profitability as well as growth (Allio, 2012).  The literature of 
metrics may not identify specific items or checklists; however, there is clear support for 
evaluation regimes offering multiple layers of benefits if deployed thoughtfully and 
deliberately in consultation with stakeholders.   
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Evaluation Design.  Beyond considering the specific components of accountability 
measures, this review contends with how leaders can best structure metrics.  As 
previously discussed, organizations satisfied with evaluation capacities tended to have 
regimes that already met the needs of internal and external stakeholders (Carman & 
Fredericks, 2010).  Evaluation design elements borrowed from traditional, private sector 
sources emphasize internal initiatives that build management skills and improve donor 
relations when borrowed and adapted to the nonprofit sector (Chalhoub, 2009).   
Specific to nongovernmental agencies, Stern, Stame, Mayne, Forss, Davies, and 
Befani (2012) undertook a review of impact evaluation practices for programs supported 
by the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID, the corollary 
to the United States Agency for International Development).  DFID-funded organizations 
included three major components for their impact evaluations: questions, designs and 
methods, and program attributes.  Stern, et. al. (2012) recommended clustering programs 
by attributes (duration, delivery method, risk and unpredictability) rather than mission or 
context complexity—essentially, the authors recommend that DFID and other 
institutional donors cluster project evaluations amidst operations.     
As previously discussed, Eckerd and Moulton (2011) warned against lumping 
evaluation regimes together because it might encourage false equivalencies—but 
thoughtful evaluation design may help guard against this outcome. Sector leaders could 
also encourage these thoughtful practices, if only by reminding donors that evaluations in 
the third sector require different skillsets (Hall, 2014).  These stakeholders and the 
different ways they think about knowledge and expertise have an impact on resources and 
strategies.  Performance measurements and evaluations in the third sector tend to focus 
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on how to increase performance (Reed & Morariu, 2010; Benjamin, 2007; Carman, 2007) 
and how to improve practice with better data (Hall, 2014).  Leaders must think of how to 
improve their organizations as well. 
Preference for specific evaluation designs may not reflect or account for the 
strengths and weaknesses of these evaluation methods. Additionally, biases in theory and 
practice might privilege certain skills and abilities without sufficient justification, further 
complicating the sector’s attempts to design satisfactory evaluations.  Determining how 
to design evaluation remains a complicated matter not only because evaluations establish 
legitimacy (Ebrahim, 2002 & 2005) but also because of critiques of popular evaluation 
methods or systems. 
It is worth spending some time considering the ongoing issues with establishing 
ideal evaluation procedures and content.  Even establishing broad evaluation logics can 
be problematic (Hall, 2014).  Scientific evaluation methods may foster systematic 
observation and attributable outcomes; however, these may ultimately be reductive 
(Scott, 1998).  Methods that are more bureaucratic may promote rational planning and 
sequential evaluation but may result in projects designed for the evaluators only.  
Learning models are open to change and creativity, with stakeholder engagement at all 
levels (Ebrahim, 2005), but may lack necessary rigor (Hall, 2014).  Theory is dividing 
nonprofit measurement and evaluation procedures (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010).  
Furthermore, implementation costs can rise if stakeholder interest in providing feedback 
is high but funds for evaluation are low.  If evaluations are poorly designed, there can be 
a disconnect between the scale and scope of implementation and capacity.  Finally, 
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evaluation knowledge and skillsets may not be properly matched with a privileged or 
preferred approach or framework.   
The sector emphasizes sound evaluation design not only because poor evaluations 
can waste resources but also because there are multiple competing resource requests to 
support missions (Heyse, 2013).  We also understand that most organizations behave in a 
consequential, rational, and appropriate manner (March, 1997).  If given the opportunity 
to enact organization preference, some literature suggests that nonprofits mostly do so 
while promoting the organization’s goal.  Despite this broad altruism and responsible 
behavior, Heyse (2013) noted that organizations’ unfettered decisions still have external 
impacts with their service communities.  It is imperative, therefore, that we also 
interrogate the nature and procedures for making such choices amidst literature with 
dissenting voices here. 
International NGOs have shown their own initiative in developing evaluation 
practices and procedures (Rugh, 2004).  In their overview of such developments in US-
based NGOs, Kang, Anderson, and Finnegan (2012) noted a sector-wide movement to 
self-starting the implementation of longer-term impact measures.  These developments 
stand out not only because they extend the time horizon for evaluations but also because 
the US-based NGO sector is as varied as the international-based sector.  Generally, small 
international NGOs in the United States have private donors while larger international 
NGOs can compete for institutional and government funding (Kang, et. al., 2012).  
Although all international NGOs have encountered pressure to improve evaluations 
(Startling, 2003), this broader pressure is finally resulting in long-term impact 
assessments (Adelman, et. al., 2007).  The U.S. Agency for International Development 
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has a history of reporting requirements but has added longer-term goals to overall project 
outcomes (Riddell, 1999) and other donor institutions are emphasizing fundamental goals 
(Britian, 2008).   
Just as the broader international development community has professionalized 
and responded to calls for more stringent monitoring and evaluation, the landmine action 
community has also developed and refined a series of guidelines and best practices that 
govern the sector.  Despite being initially proposed in 1996 as a body of sector-specific 
protocols and having a first edition adopted in 1997, the International Mine Action 
Standards only have one chapter on evaluation and one chapter on monitoring (see IMAS 
14.10, Guide for the evaluation of mine action interventions; and IMAS 7.40, Monitoring 
of mine action organizations).  IMAS 14.10 identifies responsibilities for evaluation with 
the United Nations (as a supporter of national mine action centers), the national mine 
action authority in an affected country, mine action implementing agencies, and donors.  
The standard also encourages broad stakeholder participation (see IMAS 14.10).   
Beyond this, however, the standards for the mine action community of practice 
offer little in terms of descriptive and prescriptive guidelines.  This lack of prescription 
for measurement and evaluation is not surprising, given that the historical focus for the 
IMAS and the mine action community has been on technical proficiency and clearance 
capacity (see Reed & Morariu, 2010; Benjamin, 2007).  This lack of focus is important 
because it highlights a potential deficiency in the sector-specific literature: an emphasis 
on clearance operations without support for measurement and evaluation leaves leaders 
without critical data for project planning, service delivery, and capacity development 
competencies (Heyse, 2013).  Indeed, the IMAS on monitoring mine action organizations 
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views costs associated with confidence intervals and other statistical analysis as “better 
spent on clearing more land and avoiding accidents caused by long delays to clearing 
land” (IMAS 7.40, p. C-3).  Monitoring systems are linked to strategic goals and 
objectives but only as a means of ensuring compliance and safety.  The standards do 
underscore the importance of information management to project implementation but 
discourages information gathering that might jeopardize operational efficiency.   
As we have seen, the emphasis on making evaluations more pervasive and 
meaningful has multiple, overlapping stakeholders with varying levels of commitment to 
the endeavor (Startling, 2003; Adelman, et. al., 2007).  The incorrect assumption with an 
increased emphasis on assessments is that organization leaders and managers will see 
evaluations as self-evidently meritorious and useful (Carman, 2011).  As demonstrated by 
the IMAS on monitoring of mine-action organizations, cleared land may not be the sole 
output metric but other suggested metrics focus on compliance.  Though there has been 
some success in making long-term evaluations’ normative and descriptive frameworks 
more digestible and user-friendly, there is still goal conflict between principal and agent, 
donor and implementer, and NGO and service recipient.  There are major differences in 
the relevant theories of evaluations, specifically with the motivations for evaluation and 
how the information will be used (Allio, 2012; Burger, 2012; Carman & Fredericks, 
2010; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010).   
In resource-constrained environments, there is also a benefit in delineating how 
certain evaluation functions contribute to sustainability.  Carman (2011) encouraged the 
adoption of such thinking by leaders as “ritualistic behaviors” (p. 365).  Funders can 
contribute in this regard by rewarding grantees that proactively or positively use 
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evaluation data.  Long-term impact assessments developed internally may also avoid the 
sui generis attacks on program design because they may avoid the stigma of purposeless 
activities that displace core functions of service delivery.  There is further benefit, of 
course, if leaders can illustrate how assessments contribute in resource-constrained 
environments (Hall, 2004). 
This kind of participatory design and focus on multiple benefits can address 
critiques of externally determined evaluation design.  Evaluations can confer legitimacy, 
but ratios and other external measures push organizations toward conformity and 
comparability—they recognize efficient organizations more than effective projects, 
critics complain (Eckerd, 2014).  If we recognize that organizations are operating in “a 
complex evaluation environment,” (Eckerd, 2014, p. 439), then leaders must be wary of 
standards or measures that promote thresholds for acceptable limits of performance or 
behavior rather than overall quality.  Put another way, these evaluations focus on 
operation efficiency over strategic achievement (Allio, 2012).  By opting for assessments 
that are beneficial on a number of fronts, leaders may further incentivize the process of 
their development. 
Field Design and Changing Behavior.  Given the nature of the conventional weapons 
destruction community of practice and the areas in which this work is undertaken, it is 
vital also to consider the feasibility of conducting long-term evaluations.  There is a large 
body of literature on externally imposed evaluations in stable environments but relatively 
little about operations in contested or post-conflict zones (see Baum, 2012).  Ultimately, 
while data collection in conflict areas is difficult (Clark, 2006; Romano, 2006), doing so 
provides data that is systematic, reproducible, reliable, and valid (Cohen & Arieli, 2011).   
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This study adopts Cohen and Arieli’s (2011) definition of a conflict environment: 
“A conflict environment is one in which people, whether individuals or groups, perceive 
their needs, goals, or interests to be contradicted by the goals or interests of the other 
side...” (p.424).  Conventional weapons destruction activities are working at the edges 
and amidst these transitional spaces as well as in more stable environments.  The 
literature suggests that these factors are important to weigh—specifically if donor-
governments require data collection in impacted communities—because individuals or 
groups may view government-sanctioned interventions skeptically at best or against local 
interests at worst.  While most CWD implementing partners require consent from local 
communities, returning populations may not have been socialized to the work required 
before their return.  In this way, the expertise on data collection methods, community 
liaison practices, and shifting population demographics resides with the implementing 
partners conducting operations within the relevant communities. 
If we recognize the ways in which operational environments can influence 
assessment activities, we must also recognize the ways such assessment can change 
organization behavior.  In a study of nonprofits in South Carolina, Zimmerman and 
Stevens (2006) examined the interplay between capacity measures such as organization 
size, budget, and evaluation activities.  Not surprisingly, most of the organizations 
indicated that they were required to conduct performance oversight and management by 
an outside source.  In addition to recognizing that evaluation activities were sometimes 
cumbersome, the organizations surveyed had made changes in programming as a result of 
the evaluation results.  There has been an emphasis on accountability and compliance 
across the sector as donor-governments and other entities devolve service delivery. 
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Where leaders can take action, both within the recipient organizations and at the donor 
level, is to raise the profile of accountability mechanisms and resource them more fully.  
As Carman and Fredericks (2008) note, “Given that some nonprofit organizations are still 
struggling with the logistical and technical aspects of program evaluation, funders are 
uniquely positioned to support nonprofit organizations in ways that help them invest” 
(p.67-68). 
Additionally, interactions with other organizations may affect monitoring and 
evaluation practices.  NGOs play a critical role in disseminating management and 
accountability practices within civil society circles.  Such knowledge transfer practices 
may be particularly effective and pervasive in smaller, more technically focused 
communities of practice.  Marshall and Suarez (2013) surveyed NGOs operating in 
Cambodia in an attempt to identify influences in self-regulatory evaluation practices.  
The authors noticed an increase in self-regulatory behaviors in the organization, and that 
these entities served as carriers of community practices to indigenous organizations.  
However, the authors had difficulty pinpointing the influence of monitoring and 
evaluation, donor preferences and guidance, and overall professionalization.  There may 
also reflect interconnectedness or a small pool of donors with similar requirements. 
As has been noted, there can be a benefit to leaders outlining positive aspects of 
new evaluation and accountability regimes in resource-constrained environments 
(Carman, 2011).  Where externally imposed evaluations may present a cumbersome 
impediment without clear benefits in exchange for modifying operations or 
programming, internally developed methods can offer gradations and nuance if 
championed by the organization’s leadership (Eckerd, 2014).  This study also recognizes 
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that performance management mandates for NGOs are coming from multiple sources 
(Carnochan, et. al., 2014).  Organizational capacity is critical to effective performance 
management and data collection, and leaders are responsible for developing and 
monitoring this capacity.  It can be difficult to know how long and at what distances 
organizations manage coordination and decision-making mechanisms (Daniell, et. al., 
2011), so having a more inclusive and participatory development model may help with 




















 Starting with a grounding in resource dependence theory, accountability, 
organizational development, this study reviewed NGO leaders’ evolving relationships 
and power dynamics as donor-governments increase an emphasis on accountability.  
These theories provide a logical starting point because the international assistance and 
development sector consistently manages across multiple accountability mechanisms.  
Structural factors influence the relationships between donor-governments, host 
governments, implementing partners, recipient populations, and a constellation of other 
stakeholders and actors.   
The overall study is concerned with whether NGOs in the CWD community of 
practice develop long-term impact assessment practices in response to donor prompts and 
the ways they attempt to do so.  While many accountability mechanisms may be donor-
led or donor-influenced, this study recognizes the capacity NGOs have as agents of 
change to influence measurement and evaluation regimes.  This conceptualization of 
NGOs as valued contributors is important because it puts the relationship between donor-
government and NGO front and center.  The call for increased accountability and 
achievement is not only focused on donor requirements but also on the logical byproduct 
of relationships between stakeholders throughout the sector.   
This study interrogates the nature and processes for making choices in evaluation 
design because these choices influence and impact service delivery.  If donor-
governments give NGO leaders the option of developing LTIA components, those same 
leaders can then make determinations about how best to incorporate LTIA into service 
delivery, adapt strategy to changing donor guidelines, and to develop internal capacities.  
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As a subset to the overall research question, this study engages with two additional 
questions: if NGOs develop impact assessments, are there organizational factors to 
support the inclusion of LTIAs; and, how are CWD organizations proposing to improve 
service delivery by implementing these LTIA components.  For leaders in the technically 
complex conventional weapons destruction field, they must balance the needs of both 
accountability and service delivery while proactively engaging stakeholder groups to 
manage these forces. 
Resource Dependence Theory.  There is a long history of research and discussion on 
how leaders and organizations respond to the provision of resources, strategically deploy 
internal capacity to secure those resources, and adapt to changing conditions related to 
external resources.  First codified by Pfeffer and Salanick (1978), resource dependence 
theory postulates that there is an identifiable series of consequences for organizations 
seeking external resources.  Resource dependency theory grew from the study of 
population ecology, a subsect of biology, which focused attention at the level of 
“conspecific individuals” as a way of “delineating units for management action” (see 
Wells & Richmond, 1995, p. 462). 
Since the initial treatise, which primarily concerned organizational studies and 
structure in the private sector, there has been broad discussion of the theory’s application 
to the nonprofit sector.  The literature suggests that resources are an obvious and 
pervasive basis of power between resource-seeking and resource-granting organizations.  
This study includes research from this branch of theory because resources are especially 
dynamic and require attention from leaders.  Resources (primarily funding from donor-
governments) can also give NGO leaders the flexibility to pursue new strategies or 
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develop internal capacities.  By making strategic choices about the deployment of scarce 
resources, NGO leaders make a statement about organizational objectives and values—
setting the overall tenor of operations and helping to realize mission goals.   
Resource dependence theory helps parse the dynamics of power in the nonprofit 
sector.  Unlike the hierarchical relationships and structures of the private sector, the 
nonprofit sector includes more engagement and negotiation between stakeholders.  While 
the relationship between public and nonprofit sectors is hierarchical when resources are 
being exchanged, there is evidence of cooperation and coordination.  Leaders in both 
sectors tend to operate more cooperatively, especially when the sectors conduct advocacy 
for policies and develop best practices.  As Verbruggen and Millis (2011) noted, 
resources inherently limit choices for nongovernmental organizations.  Where 
governments set standards and provide funding and resources, there is increasing 
leverage within the resource dependence framework.   
Similarly, in this theoretical framework, Burger and Owens (2013) conducted a 
study of large-scale NGOs in Uganda and those organizations’ propensity to survive.  
NGOs are particularly important in developing communities because of the lack of 
indigenous capacity and resources.  Despite the belief that older and larger NGOs would 
be more likely to survive, research showed this hypothesis correct but dependent on 
short-term funding mechanisms like grants.  The survival of an organization was largely 
dependent on seeking a grant; the sourcing and use of resources were critical 
determinants of organizational structure.  Leaders of NGOs should be attuned to such 
dynamics, which could cause a change to long-term organization capacity and strategy in 
service of short-term resource seeking.   
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Batley (2011) observed that organizations with nongovernmental funding made 
strategic decisions and exercised greater strategic latitude than service providers with 
greater diplomatic tendencies exercise.  This dynamic makes sense if we understand that 
organizations delivering services in place of governments must also advocate their cases 
to ensure continued funding rather than representing a particular donor perspective.  Even 
if an organization were successful in securing funding over a long period of time, the 
organization must continue to mobilize resources.  AbouAssi (2014b) postulated that 
NGOs struggle with resource dependence from a variety of sources.  By examining a 
subset of NGOs in Lebanon, the author found evidence that a high resource dependence 
on external funding sources might indicate a willingness or tendency to be more 
compliant with external requirements. Carman and Fredericks (2008) noted that many 
organizations are using data to improve activities—but more than half of the 
organizations surveyed also admitted to using this data primarily to solicit additional 
money.  NGO leaders can capitalize on outside pressures from donors to develop internal 
competencies and build capacity. 
We see in these studies a tendency toward an NGO/donor-government 
bifurcation.  Some of the literature characterizes donors as part of a monolithic class—
one that makes decrees to a responsive, flexible pool of NGOs seeking resources.  Such 
perspectives are unhelpfully simplistic because they miss the depth and breadth of the 
relationships between NGOs and donor-governments.  Such an interpretation also 
suggests an understanding of power dynamics that undersells the leadership of NGOs and 
undervalues their strategic planning capacity.  Research has shown that tension between 
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donor-governments and NGOs has the ability to generate creativity and solidify identity 
(Arvidson, 2018).   
Leaders at NGOs and donor-governments occupy distinct but convergent spheres 
of activity and influence.  As donor-governments have devolved responsibility for direct 
foreign or international assistance, NGOs have filled the gaps to promote agendas, deliver 
services, and manage stakeholders.  Conventional weapons destruction projects have 
significant startup and fixed/running costs, often involving large capital purchases to 
supplement labor, supplies, and other expenses.  Of course, NGOs and donor-
governments are concerned with reigning in costs where possible; however, there is 
significant leverage for NGOs already operating in the space.  They have the technical 
expertise, capital assets, and other resources—in short: donor-governments to CWD 
projects could not easily replace these capacities.   
For those organizations seeking federal funding, a grant is now more akin to a 
performance agreement—such as with a contract—thereby making funding to support 
measurement and evaluation critical.  Carman (2009) found that federal funding was a 
significant predictor of organizational compliance with external monitoring requirements.  
At the same time, research suggests a new paradigm that represents and recognizes 
NGOs’ agency (Bryce, 2006).  In many places, third sector entities and NGOs represent 
social capital and economic power—effectively serving as semi-independent contractors 
for the donor government.  Even if these organizations do not articulate power vis à vis 
donor and host governments, NGOs have considerable impact and influence on the 
communities they serve. 
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AbouAssi (2014a) speculated that there is an interplay between factors considered 
by resource dependence theory, including revenue, sustainability of funding sources, and 
the availability of alternatives.  That having been said, the sector is impacted by resource 
dependence theory every time an NGO voluntarily accepts donor priorities over 
organization mission.  As Batley (2011) noted, a formal working relationship can be 
followed by informal or trust-based relationships (both positively and negatively).  In an 
environment with multiple accountability mechanisms, structural factors influence these 
relationships—but NGOs can adopt strategies to better manage these connections.  This 
adoption of strategic responses is particularly key for NGO leaders to understand as they 
develop relationship with donor-governments and host-nation stakeholders.  Especially in 
CWD programs, where NGOs are the front-facing contact with service beneficiaries and 
donor-governments may be geographically distant, NGOs are the principal intermediary 
for the donor-government.   
Power Dynamics.  The devolution of services from governments to implementing 
partners represents an important change in the balance of power dynamics between 
donors and the organizations they fund (Marshall & Suarez, 2013).  When considering 
the NGO sector in Lebanon, AbouAssi (2014b) found evidence that increased financial 
support limited information asymmetry in the relationship between governments and the 
implementing organizations they supported.  Limited asymmetry in practice may reflect 
the reality that governments have an inherent interest in better preparing the agents they 
select to carry out services in their name—more transparency levels the balance of power 
but also allows the NGOs to better serve as representatives of the donor governments.  As 
noted, the literature has been interested in these changing dynamics as part of broader 
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changes to the relationships between donor-governments, host-nation government, 
service providers, and communities.   
The literature has offered a defense of at least tangential benefits to this increased 
use of data in leveling the power imbalance between donors and implementing partners.  
Building on previous research (see Brown & Troutt, 2003), Brown and Troutt (2004) 
investigated power dynamics between governments and NGOs and found evidence that 
organizational stresses over financing were diminished by a more cooperative 
relationship.  They write, “The uneven relationship between governments and 
organizations, the divergence of government goals and organizational, and, in particular, 
government control of organizations through the definition of contract details heavily 
influence the existence and level of transaction costs to both recipient organizations and 
funders” (Brown & Troutt, 2004, p. 9).  A more collegial or reciprocal relationship 
between leaders in donor-governments and service providers may help smooth out the 
power imbalances that persist—measurement and evaluation mechanisms once seen as 
edicts from the donor-government may become a way for the NGO to demonstrate value 
and initiate a conversation about overall impact.  
In addition to relevant critiques about governments as donors, the literature notes 
there are significant structural barriers for organizations seeking to influence donor 
preferences or divine funder policy changes.  We recognize and must account for the 
issue of information asymmetry in such a multi-agent operating environment—not just 
between donors and NGOs but also between donors and communities (Burger & Owens, 
2013).  An inherent goal for international development activities is sustainability, and 
information asymmetry threatens the potential for capacity building.   
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The change in sector power dynamics is a critical component for NGO leaders to 
understand and strategically plan for when soliciting potential donors or delivering 
services for existing donor-governments.  At the same time, the devolution of services 
understandably, for governments, results in an emphasis on accountability and 
compliance (see Carman & Fredericks, 2008).  It is important to think of ways to improve 
the utility of these accountability and compliance mechanisms because they are 
increasingly a part of the operational environment for NGOs.  Governments are a central 
fixture in the realm of foreign affairs—by extension, then, governments have a place in 
advocating for international development and conflict recovery (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).  
Furthermore, the cost components for CWD activities are significant, running into the 
millions of dollars per year.  Such funding requirements quickly overwhelm all but the 
largest institutional donors.  As we have seen in the literature and in the field, 
governments serve not only as the primary interlocutors for diplomacy and foreign affairs 
but also as primary resources for funding and engagement.   
Beyond the clearance of explosive hazards, CWD activities seek to promote 
indigenous capacity (see IMAS 14.10) and engender the preconditions for sustainable 
management of residual CWD tasks.  By supporting long-term impact assessments, 
donor-governments can help crystalize the focus of an intervention around the longer-
term outcomes from present-day activities in collaboration with implementing partners 
and other stakeholders.  Organizational effectiveness theory (Herman & Renz, 2008) and 
multiple consistency theory (Ebrahim, 2005 and 2010) offer a compelling framework 
from which to interrogate the mechanisms and dynamics of power in international 
development.  Using the aperture of organizational effectiveness theory, Herman and 
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Renz (2008) postulated that organizational capacity and management are most 
appropriately measured as a development objective rather than compliance with a best 
practice.  Multiple constituency theory also allows us to view the overlapping or 
competing motivations in collecting information on services and measuring growth 
(Campbell & Lambright, 2016).  From this perspective, leaders of donor-governments 
and implementing partners can justify using performance metrics because they can be 
linked to development, community representation, and long-term impact.  Criticism of 
single sets of evaluation criteria (see Connolly, Conlin, & Deutch, 1980) underscore the 
opportunity for leaders of donor-governments and NGOs to work collaboratively. 
Organizations have subsets, diverse stakeholders, and varied missions (see Balser 
& McClusky, 2005; Herman & Renz, 1997 and 2008).  As discussed when considering 
multiple accountability and cooperation relationships, these informal and formal 
relationships support each other (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010).  Donors (and governments 
as donors) must do the same or risk serving as a hegemon.  As Campbell and Lambright 
(2016) note, applying multiple constituency theory to performance measurement 
practices allows leaders to access a variety of inputs and perspectives across stakeholder 
groups.  In their survey, the authors found that outcome data was important to donors, as 
were expenditure reports—these data points demonstrated both a provision of services 
and reiterated need.   
It can be beneficial, as Ebrahim (2010) posited, to visualize donor-governments in 
a broader framework with multiple stakeholders and leaders.  The upward and downward 
accountability of the donor-NGO relationship encourages a collaborative process.  
Leaders must also develop internal capacity to properly conduct performance 
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management and data collection.  It is can be difficult for donor-governments to 
understand how NGO leaders manage coordination and decision-making mechanisms, so 
a more participatory model may help with field-driven LTIA design (Daniell, et. al., 
2011).  As will be discussed further, NGO leaders can encourage a mutually beneficial 
partnership on issues like monitoring, evaluation, and impact assessments.  The CWD 
community of practice itself has historical antecedents in just such a multi-stakeholder 
reality.  The Ottawa Convention could not have appeared without leaders in advocacy 
organizations identifying a need and simultaneously designing service delivery 
mechanisms to address it.  Donor-governments were a critical component but not the 
catalyst—in the case of the Ottawa Convention, somewhat abnormally for international 
diplomacy, service providers were in communication with affected communities before 
resources had been identified.  The strident advocacy of the NGOs involved with the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines birthed the CWD community of practice and 
sparked the lobbying for specific resources from governments.   
Even without a consensus on how best to enforce accountability, the use of public 
funds to support public goals via non-public entities is a primary driver for calls to 
measure nonprofit impact.  NGO perspectives are disrupted, as has been discussed, by 
asymmetric power and information (Eade, 2007).  Given that standardized or mandated 
reporting often does not match the needs and patterns of an organization, capitalizing on 
NGO creativity with optional post-intervention impact assessments may help in the 
search for “an approach to solidarity-based partnerships with an infinite variety of 
expressions” (Eade, 2007, p. 637).  This study investigated these factors at additional 
length.  Beside the lingering imperative to report for compliance and legitimacy, a 
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participatory model further improves the accountability process by increasing the benefits 
to implementing partners and donor-governments.  If donors adopt a more fluid process, 
it could see not only increased accountability but also the development of more effective 
metrics as part of that framework. 
Donors already provides an existing framework for evaluation (and with it comes 
the expectation of assessment) with required quarterly and final reporting on project 
deliverables and financial management.  LTIAs would be adding an additional layer of 
scrutiny—or an additional opportunity for leaders to tell the story of their efforts and 
advocate for greater resource provision.  Participatory evaluation design, or at least a 
measurement and evaluation framework that is less prescriptive and more experimental, 
allows implementing partners to provide work in a more cooperative environment.  The 
question then becomes how to develop the evaluation regime within existing mechanisms 
to better develop internal capacity and avoid disrupting ongoing service delivery.   
Given the standardized nature of CWD activities, we may expect clustering of 
certain evaluation components across the sector.  We may also reasonably expect that 
optional LTIA elements will be relevant to those organizations conducting similar work 
in different contexts.  Broader utility is especially important, as optional LTIA prompts 
have not been included in all notices of funding opportunity but will be equally beneficial 
to implementing partners undertaking CWD activities in other places.  Each competitive 
announcement contains specific information on the context of CWD activities under 
consideration (for example, background on the kind of weapons contamination in a 
specific country or the interest in a global problem set).  The vast majority of the funding 
opportunity announcement remains unchanged from previous announcements (see 
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Appendix A) and focuses instead on the technical qualifications (proposal length, eligible 
organizations, etc.) for applicants to consider.   
 Donor-governments providing an optional prompt for LTIAs as part of project 
solicitation may activate internal organizational factors related to capacity—prior funding 
relationships and dynamics, staff capacity and management—and overall mission factors 
(see Figure 1).  The LTIAs developed are an outcome of a more participatory model with 
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The optional LTIA component in competitive announcements also recognizes that NGO 
agency in the international development field—the mechanisms and dynamics of 
relationships between donor-governments and NGOs may be imbalanced, but the 
ecosystem requires both working together (Herman & Renz, 2008).  While NGO leaders 
must respond to changes in donor requirements, they can determine how those changes 
will be implemented within the organization.   
 At the same time that NGO leaders are making decisions about pursuing funding 
from a donor-government, they may also activate organizational factors related to the 
NGO’s mission and relationship to service recipients and other stakeholders.  The 
inclusion of LTIAs may become another opportunity for NGO leaders to demonstrate 
value and tell a story about positive impact.  There is a clear interplay between capacity 
measures, organizational mission and objectives, and evaluation activities (Zimmerman 
& Stevens, 2006).  By developing and implementing long-term impact assessments, NGO 
leaders can activate positive organizational factors within donor-government monitoring 
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Questions of the Study 
Working from this theoretical framework, we understand the dynamic nature and 
interrelatedness of assessments, donor requirements, and NGO agency.  Theory suggests 
a conflicted relationship between donors and NGOs, one in which accountability is 
important but stakeholder buy-in is not guaranteed.  Besides lacking a clear path for 
collaboratively developed long-term impact assessments, there are legitimate critiques of 
governments as donors and of measurement and evaluation displacing overall 
organizational mission.   
Resource dependence theory reminds us that resource-limited organizations will 
simultaneously respond to donor prompts but are constrained by their internal capacity.  
Such power dynamics related to information, resources, strategy, and priority setting are 
central to this study because NGO and donor-government leaders must consistently 
balance the needs of accountability and service delivery proactively.  These relationships 
in the humanitarian assistance field are not always clear—NGOs must advocate for 
continued funding while representing a particular donor to a community in need.   
The literature underscores this perspective—while various stakeholder groups 
encourage or require accountability mechanisms, the focus of most NGOs is on 
delivering services to meet overall mission goals.  We have seen significant critiques of 
government performance as donors, given the power dynamics of working between two 
sectors (public and nonprofit) with an imbalance in information and funding.  That said, 
the literature recognizes that NGOs exercise considerable discretion when functioning as 
the primary interface between affected communities in need and the entities providing 
resources and strategic guidance.  In the humanitarian assistance field in general and the 
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CWD community of practice in particular, the devolving of services from governments to 
NGOs has led to a more fluid relationship vis a vis accountability.   
This devolution of services has increased the need for increased accountability 
mechanisms to ensure quality (Marshall & Suarez, 2013).  While NGOs may have more 
latitude in how measurement and evaluation regimes are deployed, there are still 
structural questions about how to select metrics and design evaluations to ensure quality 
service delivery.  As we have seen, there is a further complication to this process when 
selecting appropriate metrics and evaluation designs for field deployment to transitional 
and post-conflict spaces (Baum, 2012).  Donor-government and NGO leaders must hold 
all of these factors in balance while serving and responding to their independent and 
mutual stakeholders. 
Every year, the Department of State makes part of its operational budget available 
to implementing partners under competitive announcements.  The announcements have 
required and suggested components, in line with federal grant regulations and office 
standard operating procedures.  The required and suggested components of each 
competitive announcement help guide the core and supplementary material submitted by 
implementing partners as part of their application packets. 
The Department decided in part to make the LTIA component optional because 
the International Mine Action Standards are mostly silent on the subject of impact 
assessments.  Without input from the community of practice, there was concern about 
rolling out new measurement and evaluation requirements and the potential disruption to 
service delivery.  At the same time, there was interest in incentivizing the development of 
such measures on an optional basis.  Given the energy, creativity, and cost-consciousness 
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of the nonprofit sector, donor-governments can anticipate receiving proposals that 
implemented LTIA measures that would not disrupt overall CWD project activities 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).   
Based on this theoretical framework and the practical limitations of the CWD 
sector, this study sought to understand if CWD implementing partners develop 
interventions and distinguish themselves in response to donor-prompted changes.  As has 
been discussed, the nature of LTIAs allows NGOs maximum flexibility to creatively 
develop an intervention that will not negatively interfere with service delivery.  In this 
low-stakes, no-fault environment, NGOs can develop assessment components that 
integrate into CWD activities—so assessments can reflect program delivery rather than 
drive it.  This study will interrogate the development of LTIAs in response to donor 
prompts by also seeking to understand what organizational factors may support the 
inclusion of LTIAs and how those same organizations propose to improve service 









Mixed Method Design  
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NGOs are resource-sensitive both in the need to solicit additional funds and the 
desire to conserve scarce resources when implementing accountability mechanisms and 
other services.  At the same time, it is important for donor-governments to incentivize 
their priorities.  Doing so not only ensures compliance with stated priorities but also 
promotes the broader adoption of long-term impact assessments across multiple 
implementing partners and contexts. 
The Department has increased the number of opportunities it releases in response 
to Presidential and Congressional directives to transparently and openly award foreign 
assistance funds.  This process obviously represents an important investigation for CWD 
practitioners but also a sample of convenience.  The selection of this sample is tied to the 
overall analysis plan for the study (see Fowler, 2009) and the interest in how NGO 
leaders are developing LTIA activities. 
Population.  The overall population of interest was the applications submitted by 
international NGOs and other entities (public international organizations, institutions of 
higher education) as they sought grants from the United States Government.   
Currently, the Department funds more than 50 organizations conducting CWD 
activities in over 60 countries.  Additionally, while the Department is the largest bilateral 
donor-government, there are other major and minor donor-governments, private 
foundations, and other donor stakeholders influencing the service delivery and 
measurement practices of implementing partners.  The competitive announcements are 
made available for bilateral (country-specific) activities or global support for 
conventional weapons destruction projects.   
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The total population was 315 applications over 43 competitive announcements.  
To limit interference of project-level duplication in application materials, I decided to 
only use one announcement per country and project type.  If there were multiple 
competitive announcements in a single country, I did not include applications from 
competitions with similar objectives as these might contain duplicate elements.  For 
example, there were six announcements for landmine clearance in Afghanistan; this study 
only reviewed applications received from one of those competitions.  This resulted in 117 
applications from 25 competitive processes.  Four countries (Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Colombia, and Iraq) had multiple competitions with project activities that were 
sufficiently different that organizations could not duplicate material (see Table 1).    
Mixed Method Investigation.  This study assessed the responses of grant-seeking 
organizations to determine if they develop long-term impact assessment at the prompt of 
a donor-government.  Using a convergent design (see Figure 2 below), this study adopted 
a parallel mixed methods approach consisting of quantitative and qualitative strands to 
better understand the components of long-term impact assessments (Cresswell & Clark, 
2011).  The convergent parallel design allows strengths and weaknesses of the 
quantitative strand to balance and engage with those of the qualitative strand, thereby 
building a more fulsome picture of the research question.  The quantitative data gathered 
during the investigation substantiates the observations from the qualitative assessment; 
likewise, the qualitative data provides a better understanding of the interactions observed 
in the quantitative section.  Quantitative data was collected from the 117 applications 
submitted during the 25 competitive processes.  Qualitative data was gathered from the 
applications that proposed LTIA activities to determine if there was consensus about best 
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practices from the field.  The information gathered from each strand was then interpreted 
separately and together. 
 
Figure 2 
Mixed Methods Research Design – The Quantitative and Qualitative Strands 
 
 This study used a convergent parallel mixed methods design because it addressed 
separate but equally important aspects of the intervention (see Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & 
Turner, 2007).  For quantitative aspects, the logistic regression elucidated factors that 
were influencing particular organizations to compete for grants.  For qualitative analysis, 
a review of the successful applications helped determine what LTIA components arose 
consistently.  The combined results from both the quantitative strand and qualitative 
strand build internal consistency (Cresswell, 2014) while drawing out commonalities of 
service delivery structure, evaluation focus, organization characteristics, and best 
practices.   
RQ: Do NGOs develop long-term impact assessments in 
response to donor prompts?
Quantitative Strand: 
If they do, are there organizational factors to support the inclusion of 
LTIAs?
1: Does existing 
funding in a country 
make an 
organization more 
likely to include 
LTIAs?
2: Does staff size
make an 
organization more 
likely to include 
LTIAs?
3: Does total funding 
requested make an 
organizations more 









Is there consensus or 
best practice being 
proposed in 
applications to 
implement LTIAs in 
the field?
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Quantitative Strand, Theory Development, and Hypotheses   
The quantitative strand of this study explored the research question: What 
organizational factors support (or associated with) the inclusion of long-term impact 
assessment in response to donor-prompted change?  Hypothesis development began with 
the organizational characteristics that might support the development of LTIAs.   
Variables.  This study sought to measure previous funding and its relationship to 
continued success with specific donor types (in this case, funding from donor-
governments).  As discussed in the literature review, the international NGO sector has 
seen an increased emphasis on LTIAs or long-horizon objectives (see Britian, 2008, and 
Riddell, 1999) but some structural elements may explain why organizations opt to 
include LTIA elements in their project proposals.  Previous research has examined the 
interplay between capacity measures such as organization size and budget with 
evaluation activities (Zimmerman & Stevens, 2006). 
Previous Funding.  Lu (2015) found that previous funding from donor-
governments was a strong determinate of continuing funding—an established relationship 
between donor-governments and a particular NGO might engender a preference for 
continued funding.  Hodge and Piccolo (2005) found that a funding source is a strong 
factor in NGO strategy selection and development.  Further, previous funding and a 
positive response to funder requirements have been found to have a determinate 
relationship on NGO actions unless a strategic process is in place (Stone, Bigelow, & 
Crittenden, 1999).  Gronbjerg (1991) found that strategic decisions depend on stable 
funding sources and a desire by nonprofits to lock in funding over the long-term.  Prior 
funding may also indicate that an organization has the capacity to apply for and manage 
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donor-government grant funds.  This study collected information on whether the 
Department had previously funded the successful CWD organization in-country. 
H1: Receiving funding from the donor-government in the previous year will increase the 
likelihood that an organization included LTIAs. 
 Staff Size.  In previous studies, organization size has been shown to impact 
strategy (see Pope, 2009).  Larger full-time staff numbers have been linked to increased 
professionalism and rationalism in nonprofit organizations (Hwang & Powell, 2009).  
Additionally, Stone, Bigelow, and Crittenden (1999) found that organization size was 
negatively related to closure or vulnerability—larger organizations had larger capacity 
and could take proactive steps to develop a strategy to withstand external shocks.  I based 
this continuous variable on project staff counted in each application.  Larger staffing 
levels might allow project staff to take on roles related to LTIA development and 
deployment and is expected to be positively associated with LTIA inclusion.   
H2: Larger staff size will increase the likelihood that an organization included LTIAs. 
 Funding Requested.  Each competitive opportunity issued has a ceiling on total 
funding available.  NGOs may apply for the full amount or a smaller amount.  Larger 
grants have been found to attract more attention and competition than smaller grants 
while also allowing organizations to expand their capacity and develop larger 
interventions with more thorough services.  McClusky (2002) found that budgets and 
staff affected the division of roles and responsibilities—governance structures change 
based on the size of an organization’s budget and staffing.  Larger grants attract more 
attention but may also allow NGOs wider latitude to implement creative solutions, take 
risks, pursue strategic objectives, and develop new capacities.  Behn, Devries, and Lin 
LEADING FROM THE FIELD   
 
55 
(2010) linked larger organizational budgets with greater organizational transparency, 
which may contribute to more sharing of data on successful service delivery.  Research 
indicates that increased funding brings additional scrutiny while potentially providing 
more resources to staff and implement accountability mechanisms.  Additionally, if 
organizations are requesting larger amounts of funding they may be more inclined to 
address the optional LTIA prompt as a way of satisfying donor-government inclinations.   
H3: A larger project budget request will increase the likelihood that an organization 
included LTIAs. 
Quantitative Sample and Procedures.  My sample was drawn from the total population 
of 315 applications submitted across 43 competitive announcements between 2014 and 
2019.  I took applications that had been submitted in announcements that included a 
prompt for LTIAs—117 applications from 25 competitions (see Table 2).  The inclusion 
of the LTIA prompt was left to the discretion of the donor-government team responsible 
for administering the grant.  The sample included 19 countries and three global project 
areas with a majority (54%) including some component of LTIAs (see further discussion 
below).  Applications from two competitions that received the LTIA prompt had to be 
excluded because they were incomplete or had been lost.   
This study included applications from the same organization but excluded 
multiple applications from the same organization in each competitive process.  For 
example, if an NGO submitted two applications under one competitive announcement, I 
kept only one application for review (this was uncommon; three applications had to be 
excluded over two competitive announcements).   Given that this study’s attention is on 
the field-level deployment of project-specific LTIAs, I did not attempt to control for the 
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clearinghouse effect or to make determinations about country-specific issues (security, 
financial risk, etc.).    
The selection of this sample was tied to the overall analysis plan for the study (see 
Fowler, 2009; Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002) and the interest in how to encourage LTIA 
development in a more participatory process.     
 
Table 1 
Competitive Announcements and Applications Considered 
Announcement Applications Applications 
including LTIA 
Afghanistan Clearance 6 6 
Afghanistan Survey 7 7 
Angola 5 3 
Cambodia Clearance 3 3 
Cambodia Survey 1 1 
Chad 2 2 
Colombia Clearance 13 6 
Colombia Survey 11 5 
Small Arms Review 4 0 
Guatemala 3 0 
Honduras 3 0 
Iraq Risk Education 6 3 
Iraq Monitoring 3 2 
Jordan 5 2 
Kosovo 2 1 
Laos 4 4 
Lebanon 3 3 
MANPADS 4 4 
Niger 2 1 
Palau 7 4 
Peru 5 0 
Quick Reaction Force 5 0 
Somalia 3 0 
South Sudan 3 2 
Ukraine 5 4 
Vietnam 2 0 
Total applications: 117 
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The dependent variable noted whether an applicant responded to the prompt for 
long-term impact assessments and included such activities in its proposal (coded 0 for no 
and 1 for yes).  To make this determination, I conducted a textual analysis of all 117 
applications in the sample (Lacy, Watson, Riffe, & Lovejoy, 2015).  Using a keyword 
search or manually scanning the proposal packets, I noted whether an application 
included provisions for LTIAs (coded as 0 for no or 1 for yes).  Further textual analysis 
would be added to the qualitative analysis, discussed in later sections. 
The first independent variable was previous funding.  I based this bivariate 
indicator on providing a grant to the organization within one year of the award 
recommendation (coded 0 for no and 1 for yes).  The independent variable of 
organization size was a continuous variable based on the project staff size denoted in 
each application gathered either from budgets, proposal texts, or organograms.  The 
independent continuous variable of grant size was based on the level of funding requested 
in each application.  The descriptive statistics for the average of the independent and 
dependent variables is given in Table 2.  
Slightly more than half (54%, n=63) of the sample included some component of 
long-term impact assessment methodologies and half did not (46%, n=54).  Fewer than 
half (44%, n=51) had previously received funding from the donor-government within the 
previous calendar year; the majority (56%, n=66) of projects had not received funding 
from the donor-government in the previous year.  The mean proposed project team size 
was almost 46, though the median staff size of 25 indicates smaller teams.  The smallest 
proposed team size of one individual and the largest 230 staff members.  The smallest 
amount of funding requested under the competitive announcements was $120,175 and the 
LEADING FROM THE FIELD   
 
58 
largest was $4,000,000.  The mean funding level of $924,955 and median of $819,500 




Variable Mean Median Range Min. Range Max. 
DV: LTIA inclusion 0.54 - - - 
IV: Previous funding 0.44 - - - 
IV: Staff size 45.85 25 1 230 
IV: Funding requested $924,955 $819,500 $120,175 $4,000,000 
n=117 
 
Quantitative Results.  To test the relationship between the dependent variable of 
response to the LTIA prompt and the independent variables, I conducted a direct logistic 
regression using the categorical (previous funding) and continuous (staff size and funding 
requested) independent variables with the categorical dependent variable (LTIA 
included). 
The direct logistic regression model selected all 117 cases; no data was missing 
from the applications selected based on the previously described criteria.  The SPSS 
classification report for the baseline model, before inputting explanatory variables, had an 
overall predictive value of 53.8 percent correct (representing a near-random 
classification; see Field, 2004).  See Table 3 for an overview of the baseline model.   
 





 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) -2LL 
Original 
Constant 0.154 0.185 .691 0.2480 .406 1.167 161.503 
Note. n=117 
The initial model indicated a lack of statistical significance (p=0.406) and a 
coefficient of the constant (i.e., the intercept) of 0.154 in the model (see Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2006).  The lack of statistical significance in the baseline indicates that the 
coefficient for one or more of the independent variables will increase the model’s 
predictive power. 
 SPSS then ran the direct logistic regression model with the three independent 
variables.  The assessment of fit, based on the results in Table 4, indicate a moderate fit 
of R2=0.78 (the initial -2 Log likelihood of 161.503 divided by the model -2 Log 
likelihood of 126.025).  Logistic regression models input to SPSS can produce a number 
of pseudo R-squared statistics.  Cox & Snell’s R2 coefficient, which accounts for sample 
size, is 0.262.  Field (2004) noted that the Cox & Snell R2 coefficient of determination for 
the logistic regression model never reaches the maximum value of 1 and recommends a 
number of other statistics.  The regression model indicated a Nagelkerke R2 coefficient of 
0.349, which indicates that the variables are exerting a limited amount of influence on the 
outcome of the model.  The Hosmer & Lemeshow Test is not statistically significant, 
which is desired (Field, 2004).  The regression also produced a Chi-square probability 
distribution statistic of 35.478 (df=3, p<.001), which suggests that the model is not over-
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dispersed (see Field, 2004).  The regression shows a moderate positive relationship in the 
model.   
 
Table 4 







Hosmer & Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square      df            Sig. 
Step 1 126.025 0.262 0.349 5.942 8 0.654 
Note. n=117 
 Based on the results of the logistic regression (see Table 5), the study did not find 
sufficient evidence that the independent variable for previous funding is a predictive 
factor on whether an organization included LTIAs in its proposal (H1).  The model did 
find support for the hypotheses that suggest a relationship between the inclusion of 
LTIAs and the proposed staff size (H2) and requested funding level (H3).  Both of these 
variables indicate a positive relationship in the model and were statistically significantly 
different from zero (see Table 5).  The coefficient for proposed staff size (H2: 
Exp(B)=1.017) and for funding requested (H3: Exp(B)=1.000) indicate a positive 
interaction between the dependent variables and the independent variable of LTIA 
inclusion.  A larger funding request level and larger staff size were found to be positively 
related to the probability for LTIA inclusion, and the overall model is statistically 
significantly different from zero.   Each additional staff member requested in the proposal 
increased the odds ratio of receiving funding by two percent, which may be related to a 
wide range of staff sizes proposed.  With a Beta coefficient of 0.000001 (or a 0.0001% 
increase in the likelihood of funding for each additional dollar requested), every $10,000 
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in additional funding requested increased the likelihood of funding by one percent.  This 
variable also had a wide range of values, as funding requested had a minimum value of 
$120,175 and $4,000,000.  The impact of these relationships on leaders’ decision making 
and prioritization process will be taken up following discussion of the qualitative results. 
 
Table 5 
Proposals Include LTIAs and Prior Funding, Staff Size, Requested Funding 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. for Exp(B) 
  
Included     
 
    
Prev. Funding 
(1=yes) 
0.502 0.481 1.091 1 0.296 1.653 0.644 4.243 
Staff Size 0.017 0.008 4.325 1 0.038* 1.017 1.001 1.033 




5.671 1 0.017* 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Constant -2.009 0.681 10.85
3 
1 0.001* 0.134   
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Qualitative Strand and Data Integration  
To augment the quantitative analysis, this study also aimed to refine what is 
known about the CWD sector in particular and donor-NGO relationships more generally 
by exploring the potential similarities between applications submitted under competitive 
announcements and their LTIA activities.  The essential research question of the 
qualitative strand was: Is there consensus or best practice being proposed in applications 
to implement LTIAs in the field? 
To this end, the study used qualitative analysis to determine what, if any, 
emergent themes or practices were being proposed in responses to the LTIA prompt.  
Any emergent themes or practices would help supplement the quantitative results and 
provide further understanding of the field’s approach to impact assessment through a 
more participatory model.  Qualitative results also help build a better picture of how 
NGO leaders can manage coordination and decision-making mechanisms in a more 
participatory model (Daniell, et. al., 2011).  The qualitative research strand was designed 
to elucidate areas of consensus from the field that might inform best practice and improve 
service delivery.  In the absence of formal guidance on how best to deploy long-term 
impact assessment measures, the implementing partners could (theoretically) lead on the 
initiative and propose mechanisms that best met donor intent while engaging NGO 
creativity and capacity.   
Qualitative Sample and Procedures.  To conduct the qualitative analysis, I reviewed 
the 117 applications that had been submitted under a competitive process between 2015 
and 2019 that included the LTIA prompt.  Having conducted textual analysis for the 
quantitative strand to determine whether an application contained LTIA elements, I 
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returned to the applications that had proposed LTIA measures.  That resulted in 63 
applications (54% of the sample of 117).   
Data from the 63 applications was collected by not immediately categorized.  
While quick categorization helps with researcher recall (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), there is 
not broad consensus within the mine action community of practice to guide such data 
coding.  Instead, I conducted a word search based on the literature review to determine 
relevant responses (Lacy, Watson, Riffe, & Lovejoy, 2015).  I recorded this material with 
the application data.  I reviewed each of the full proposals (both funded and unfunded) 
not only for LTIA methodology but also for any measurement or evaluation procedures 
based on common terminology discussed in the literature review.  The review of both 
funded and unfunded proposals was intentional—the qualitative analysis would benefit 
from a fuller understanding of the components developed by operators even if the 
proposal had not been successful. 
The keyword search was primarily conducted by electronic search functions 
(some existed only in paper format and had to be manually scanned) for words related to 
impact assessment throughout the entire application.  This included “impact,” 
“measurement,” “outcome,” “evaluation,” “quality,” “assurance,” “assessment,” and 
“control.”  Terms selected for the keyword search came from the operational language of 
the two International Mine Action Standards on monitoring and evaluation.  As 
previously noted, the IMAS are primarily concerned with compliance, safety, and 
conformity; however, despite not reflecting the best practices in monitoring and 
evaluations, the IMAS represent the minimum requirement for operations undertaken by 
the CWD community of practice.  These words reflect a broad range of activities related 
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to impact assessment in the research literature as well but seen through the lens of the 
field protocols and international standards.   
I reviewed the entire application to determine what measurement and assessment 
activities might be included because the donor-government has standard terms and 
conditions for all of its grants that include short-term monitoring and performance data.  
Beyond the requirement for quarterly programmatic and financial reporting (including 
performance indicators for specific project outputs and objectives), the donor-government 
requires implementing partners to complete quarterly metrics tables that track 
quantitative progress over the grant’s lifecycle.  Implementing partners must also submit 
a final report covering the same information at the end of a grant’s period of 
performance.  Given that these short-term monitoring activities are required, I anticipated 
compliance; a more thorough search of the entire application allowed me to conduct 
qualitative information analysis to determine if components were related to the research 
question or standard reporting (see Patton, 1980; Taylor, Bogdan, & DeVault, 2015).  
In conducting the search and recording responses, I used thick descriptives to 
more fully illustrate the study’s findings and potentially influence policy guidance in the 
future.  Research has suggested that emergent themes or practices would help verify the 
quantitative results and provide further understanding of the field’s approach to impact 
assessment.  This thorough reading provided information not only on whether 
organizations were proposing potential LTIA measures but might be using a different 
nomenclature than the one adopted by the donor-government.   
Data Analysis.  After conducting the keyword search, I transcribed responses related to 
long-term impact assessment into a spreadsheet.  Without an a priori assumption about 
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the nature and techniques for long-term impact assessment activities within the 
community of practice, I relied on a review of the responses to assess emergent attributes 
(Taylor, Bogdan, & DeVault, 2015).  I reviewed each application packet—technical 
proposal, budget and budget narrative, and any supplemental/annex material—that was 
provided by the grant-seeking organization.   
Having looked for the words that related to the theme of inquiry, I looked for 
grouping around themes or practices (Terrell, 2012).  In most cases, responses clustered 
into five dominant codes or areas that are important characteristics or practices for long-
term impact assessment.  These included: 
1. Structure—specific mechanisms or deliverables 
a. Identifiers: Internal or external components to gather impact data, such as 
surveys or assessments; a process by which implementing partners will 
solicit input or gauge progress; data collection and information 
management 
2. Information sources—specific data sources 
a. Identifiers: References to specific or general sources of information to 
build into the impact assessment structure described above; identifying 
beneficiaries (direct or indirect); disaggregating information as evidence 
of an understanding of impact 
3. Tools/Implementation—how to carry out data collection 
a. Identifiers: General or sector-specific tools and techniques to support data 
collection; technologies to support data collection and analysis; listing 
LEADING FROM THE FIELD   
 
66 
equipment needed (either in proposals or in budgets) to support 
information management 
4. Time horizon—events or a schedule for assessment 
a. Identifiers: Timelines for impact assessment or monitoring/evaluation 
activities; program deadlines or project milestones for data collection; 
events or timelines unrelated to required reporting (quarterly and final 
project reporting as discussed) 
5. Information dissemination—mechanisms to share results 
a. Identifiers: Intention to analyze and synthesize data collected above; 
discussions of impact data improving learning, planning, training, or 
service delivery; linking impact assessment activities with strategic goals 
and objectives 
Of the applications that did include LTIA elements (those above and beyond standard 
reporting requirement), all contained multiple elements of the five long-term assessment 
methodology components: structure, information sources, tools/implementation, time 
horizon and information dissemination.  These categories are described in greater detail 











Frequency of Specific LTIA Components in Applications 
 Structure Information 
Sources 
Tools Time Horizon Information 
Dissemination 
 
Included 63 50 31 16 12 
Not Included 0 13 32 47 51 
% Included 100% 79% 49% 25% 19% 
Note. n=63 
 
The first two areas of analysis—structure and information sources—are part of 
broader discussions about how best to collect data on project delivery, performance, and 
impact for all nonprofits.  It is important to note here that, of the applications that 
included LTIAs, all of them included multiple qualitative components to facilitate the 
LTIA collection process.  Only a few responses fell outside of these categories and 
tended to include assessment activities or follow-on benefits that were vague in 
description or relevance.  For example, three applications suggested tying impact 
assessment to sustainability but did not indicate the scope of sustainability or how impact 
data would be used to measure and evaluate it.  The inclusion of multiple qualitative 
components suggests a field that is actively engaged in developing foundational LTIA 
elements while developing a working understanding of how best to do so.  NGO leaders 
can channel this creativity into a more participatory model of assessment development 
and co-opt the process to build internal capacity and plan strategically. 
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 Structure.  Many of the applications that included LTIA elements included 
specific assessment deliverables or frameworks.  I clustered these responses under the 
category of structure because they provided a concrete way of arranging or constructing a 
systematic data-collection process—they told how the organization would conduct long-
term impact assessments.  This was the most broadly represented category; every 
application included some discussion of LTIA structure.  Examples of structure included 
comparing data internally across project components, collecting qualitative and 
quantitative data from beneficiaries, or using data to actively plan for future operations or 
interventions.  One application wrote, “Post-clearance surveys will identify the 
socioeconomic outcomes of the clearance in terms of the amount of land in use, the type 
of land use, the financial benefit for the beneficiaries in terms of annual income received 
and the investment enabled by clearance.”   While not all responses were similarly 
detailed, all applicants that included LTIAs noted some kind of process or structure to 
implement the LTIA.   
 For this category, I noted both internal and external structural factors driving 
LTIA implementation.  While the LTIA prompt focuses attention on an external structure 
from the donor-government, several of the responses highlighted internal process changes 
to make better use of the data collected.  Several applications indicated that assessment 
information would be used to improve internal training.  Beyond measuring “a real 
increase in the quality of life for the people in the communities selected for the project,” 
as one applicant wrote, LTIAs could also support improvement to technical standards and 
internal processes. 
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 Information sources. I reviewed the applications to see if any had identified 
specific (or unique) information sources.  I considered responses related to this category 
if they identified where to gather impact data.  This was the second most broadly 
represented category, with 79 percent of applications identifying a specific source for 
LTIA data collection.  Most included references to community groups, direct 
beneficiaries, local leaders, national authorities, or other sources of information.  I also 
considered the collection of information disaggregated by gender, age, occupation, or 
other factor as a distinct component of information management—anything to capture 
additional nuance in responses might indicate a deeper understanding of an intervention’s 
impact and provide benefit to a number of reporting mechanisms.   
Information sources are important to identify before an intervention to determine 
if the appropriate level of information will be gathered from sources with sufficient 
experience with the intervention.  Further, as Ebrahim (2003b) has written, accountability 
structures between NGOs and beneficiaries are inherently relational.  Details in this 
category were not as fulsome as with structure.  Nearly all of the applicants indicated that 
the “beneficiary community” would be the source of information.  One application did 
note that the project goal of improving livelihoods was linked to “reducing poverty and 
reducing socio-economic marginalization, inequalities and exclusion of vulnerable 
groups.”  This potentially could identify subsets of communities (vulnerability as a 
determining factor) and encourage engagement with these specific, often excluded 
beneficiaries.   
 Tools/Implementation.  Given the technical nature of the work being conducted 
under most CWD projects, this study was concerned with any field-level activities or 
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techniques that might improve impact assessment procedures.  Responses recorded in this 
category answered the essential question of how implementing partners would gather 
LTIA data.  Slightly less than half (49 percent) of respondents included specific tools.   
The CWD community of practice has already adopted a number of thorough 
information management systems (see IMAS 05.10: Information Management for Mine 
Action) and technologies to improve the capturing, retention, and use of data in the field.  
To date, the focus of these systems and technologies has been on the collection and 
retention of project outputs rather than impacts.   
The historic focus technical competencies in CWD projects—and a need to put 
safety and quality of operations before impact assessments—makes the use of existing 
tools or implementation mechanisms of particular interest.  Several applications proposed 
to develop capacity by training specific staff on impact assessment; to use key staff as 
embedded personnel during operations or to develop key assessment practices; or, 
working with local leaders to develop questionnaires.  One applicant proposed to conduct 
impact assessment “through short interviews at community and user level and output 
reported through ‘evaluation tables.’”  Another applicant proposed using its current 
information management system to collect additional impact assessment data.  By 
identifying specific tools, applicants detail necessary capacities for leaders to provide.   
The use of specific assessment teams to work directly with communities and 
service beneficiaries would remove measurement requirements from field/operational 
staff conducting technically challenging and safety-related responsibilities.  This would 
require an increase in funding or the lengthening of project time but would increase the 
profile of data collection.  It would also professionalize LTIA activities.   
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Eighteen of the applications (a majority of those that included tools) made 
specific reference to using core staff (meaning operational leaders and management) to 
carry out assessment activities—possibly indicating the high level of attention LTIAs 
would receive from the country team.  While the other applicants did not mention using 
staff members, it is important to note that none of the applications proposed outsourcing 
impact assessment.  Insofar as organization leaders are pursuing a strategy of LTIA 
development, they are planning to use internal capacities to do so.     
 Time horizon.  I assessed organizations’ use of time horizons or major project 
events for data collection.  These activities or time points needed to be separate and 
discrete from the standard reporting requirements (quarterly and final programmatic and 
financial reports) described in previous chapters and in the competitive announcement 
itself (Appendix A).  As noted in Table 6 above, fewer applications included a specific 
time for LTIA data collection (only 25 percent of the applications that included LTIA 
elements stated a period in which to gather information).  All of the applications that 
included a time horizon used six months as a reference period.  A few applications 
included major events like land handover ceremonies or other specific post-project events 
that would tie overall project milestones to impact assessment activities but might fall 
within the normal period of operations.  These are important to note because they 
represent concrete opportunities to gather information and are built into the overall 
project delivery even if they do not meet more rigorous measurement and evaluation 
practices.  Major events or project milestones have a forcing function of directing 
attention to phases of project completion that may occur at multiple times—raising the 
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profile of impact assessment with stakeholders and underscoring its importance with 
staff.   
The lack of responses here may indicate a level of uncertainty from the operators.  
Although descriptions of LTIAs frequently tied assessments to “sustainability” or socio-
economic improvements, very few of the applications gave any concrete time horizon (6-
12 months).  The lack of specific time horizons in a majority of the applications may also 
indicate a lack of consensus on when to incorporate assessment activities into project 
delivery.  All of the applications that listed a specific post-project time to conduct impact 
assessments were for competitive announcements with higher budget thresholds.  In these 
instances, requested budgets ranged from $500,000 to $2,600,000 (most were above the 
mean funding level of $924,955 and median of $819,500 for all applications that included 
LTIA elements).   
Information dissemination.  Finally, I reviewed the proposals’ integration of 
monitoring and evaluation—a hybrid of basic assessment measures and sector-specific 
activities that bridged the four previous clustered LTIA components.  In 12 of the 63 
proposals reviewed, applicants included a multifaceted activity that recognized the 
importance of impact assessment, transformed the data collected, or spoke to a specific 
investment in capacity to support collaboration and transparency with internal and 
external stakeholders.   These activities not only indicated some kind of information 
management but also feedback loops or continuous improvement processes (Ebrahim, 
2003a).   
Applications noted that LTIA deliverables could improve future proposals and 
reporting.  Applications also indicated that assessment activities could give operators the 
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chance to talk about the donor with beneficiary communities.  Although this is obviously 
of more interest to the donor than the beneficiaries, it does move assessment beyond 
compliance and into a position of stakeholder engagement.  One application also noted 
that the overarching mission of improving livelihoods needed to be linked to reducing 
poverty, which would require broader metrics and assessments than land cleared (see 
IMAS 7.40, Monitoring of mine action organizations).  In these instances, proposals 
identified a greater use for data than compliance and presupposed NGO command of a 
valuable resource.  Some of the applications that included elements of information 
dissemination also centered control of data with the NGO and not the donor—one of the 
applications compared the processed of information dissemination with storytelling. 
By proposing more complex components that assumed a framework for data 
collection and assumed the importance of impact assessments, these organizations were 
attempting to integrate capacity development and service delivery.  Information 
dissemination suggests that there is value in gathering and synthesizing data for use with 
internal and external stakeholders.  As Ebrahim (2003b) has noted, continuous learning 
and feedback loops are preferable to other types of evaluation; by incorporating LTIA 
into the structure of project implementation, organization leaders can build capacity and 
satisfy donor-government requirements. 
Integration of Data.  The quantitative results sought to understand what organizational 
factors supported the inclusion of long-term impact assessment activities in response to 
donor-prompted change.  Two of the independent variables made statistically significant 
impacts in the model.  In the case of the independent variable for receiving previous 
funding, there was not a statistically significant relationship between an organization’s 
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inclusion of LTIA activities and the receipt of funding from the donor government in the 
country of operations within the previous calendar year.  While past funding is often 
associated with continued support, the deployment of LTIAs may not have been 
emphasized in the past or previous funding decisions in a particular country did not 
account for these factors as heavily.   
There was support, however, for the inclusion of the two remaining independent 
variables (staff size and funding requested).  Both were statistically significant with a 
positive relationship between including LTIAs and increased staff and project budget.  
The predictive power of these relationships, when calibrated against the units of measure 
(change per $10,000 requested or additional staff member proposed), resonates with the 
findings of the qualitative strand and overall needs for capacity development.   
 Not only did a majority of applicants include some indication of LTIA practices 
in their project proposals, but the qualitative analysis also showed responses beyond the 
standard, required program and financial reporting.  These activities clustered into to two 
major groups (a normative framework and sector-specific components) that broke down 
further into five areas of interest: structure, information sources, tools/implementation, 
time horizon, and information dissemination (a hybrid of framework and sector 
operations).   
 The quantitative and qualitative strands augmented our understanding of the 
proposed LTIA practices from the study sample.  Organizations that received a donor-
government prompt on LTIAs were more likely than not to respond with some level of 
granularity on how to do so.  Perhaps most important to the study, of all the applications 
that included LTIA activities, all included multiple components to enhance overall LTIA 
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activities.  Further, all of the applications that included LTIAs proposed some structure 
by which to gather the necessary information.  This commonality in the community of 
practice suggests a growing consensus on or understanding of the importance (or 
importance to the donor-government) of LTIAs in project delivery and a willingness to 
develop LTIA elements.   
 The relationships between funding requested and staff size and the information 
sources and tools suggest that organizations are preparing to bear the responsibility for 
LTIAs internally.  None of the applications proposed outsourcing impact assessments; 
indeed, there were proposals to train specialized staff to conduct these tasks in some 
organizations.  Any efforts to develop internal capacities for LTIAs will require 
resources—either in funding or in staffing—and require leaders to plan strategically to 
maximize the benefits of these added responsibilities.   
When budgets included line items for impact assessment, it was always for staff 
travel to beneficiary communities (with some limited training budgeted in some 
instances).  This suggests that organizations are planning and budgeting to subsume 
LTIA requirements rather than create new project elements.  The open-ended prompt did 
lead to some uncertainty with regard to the time required to conduct LTIAs.  The larger 
than average funding requested by applications that provided specific time horizons 
suggests planning for longer engagements with communities or increased flexibility to 








 An engaged leader encourages strategic change (Bryson, 2004) but is also aware 
of how short-term resource seeking may shift long-term strategic planning (Burger & 
Owens, 2013).  Leaders from the conventional weapons destruction field are actively 
managing relationship between stakeholders throughout the sector.  Given the difficult 
and dangerous contexts in which they operate, it is imperative that CWD operators strike 
a balance between safety, compliance, and performance.  Leaders at all levels and with 
all measures of influence can use participatory or transformational leadership to empower 
others (Bass, 1985; George, 2007).  By managing across multiple accountability 
mechanisms, NGO leaders in the field can activate their organizations’ capacity and 
creativity within the framework of monitoring and evaluation.   
As noted above, while this study rejected one independent variable from the 
model (previous funding), there is clearly a movement in the community of practice 
toward developing more rigorous long-term impact assessment procedures.  Better 
defined monitoring systems can be linked with strategic goals and objectives.  While the 
focus of conventional weapons destruction has historically been on technical 
competencies, there is a demonstrated interplay between capacity development, 
organization mission and objectives, and evaluation activities (Zimmerman & Stevens, 
2006).  Focusing exclusively on practical accountability at the expense of strategic 
accountability (Cavill & Sohail, 2007) further endangers organizations that take on 
responsibility of seeking external resources (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978). 
 In many ways, a donor-led emphasis on accountability that is founded on a more 
participatory process is the logical progression for the landmine-action sector.  Besides 
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being a highly technical field requiring subject expertise on the part of service providers, 
it is one in which the implementing partner is the primary public face of these efforts.  
NGOs operating in conflict spaces have significantly more leverage than organizations 
seeking donor funding for more generic or less public activities.  The devolution of 
services exposes donor-governments to additional risk—leaders in these institutions must 
recognize NGOs as strategic actors with significant expertise and agency (Fogarty, 2011).  
A participatory design method of long-term impact assessments recognizes the power 
dynamics particular to the field and the pursuit of mutual aims by both donor and 
implementing partner leadership.  Additionally, the qualitative analysis completed on the 
applications has generated a number of rich avenues for research and has the potential to 
uncover and generate sector-specific best practices that improve service delivery 
globally.  
Assessments are important to operations and strategy as well as overall 
accountability and legitimacy.  The CWD community of practice and the nonprofit sector 
would clearly benefit from acquiring additional, quality data—by moving forward in a 
participatory, non-coercive manner, the data collected may have further utility to 
operations, planning, accountability, and strategy.  An overarching goal of CWD projects 
is to build indigenous capacity; so, while many accountability mechanisms may be 
donor-led, this study recognizes the opportunity to develop organizational capacity at all 
levels.  In the proposals that included LTIAs, there was a common baseline 
understanding to structure and information sources.  Information dissemination emerged 
as a higher-level integration of these structural elements with the sector-specific 
tools/techniques and time horizons.   
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Most theorists on the broader aim of impact assessments recognize that “impact,” 
for most nonprofits, equates with long-term effects (see Wainwright, 2003).  Many 
NGOs—even the highly bureaucratic and established ones—pursue theories of change 
over influence on policy goals (Fogarty, 2011).  I take here Weiss’s definition of theories 
of change, which grew from attempts to measure and analyze interventions, as the 
individual steps leading to long-term change as well as the framework for pursuing a 
project’s objectives and outcomes at each step (see Weiss, 1995).  This is especially 
relevant to the CWD community of practice, given its function as both an influencer of 
international development norms and direct service provider to conflict-affected 
countries.  Through this view, CWD activities can rebalance the common power 
dynamics of the donor/implementer divide and refocus attention on leadership and 
strategic planning capacities.  There is also an opportunity for donors or experts beyond 
the field to review and augment the initial LTIA proposals—thin proposals suggest a 
field in transition with leaders who have not yet identified sufficient resources or built 
capacities to move forward unilaterally.   
Significance of the Study and Limitations.  This study was limited in its ability 
to customize the competitive process, given the federal regulations governing notices of 
funding opportunity.  This study was further limited in its ability to test across multiple 
donors within this community of practice.  The quantitative analysis evaluated the 
relationship between the inclusion of LTIAs and requested funding and proposed staff 
size, although other factors could be influencing the model.  There are limited countries 
for operations, implementing partners, operational cycles, and competitive process—
further restrictions on the generalizability of this study and its findings.  While this model 
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cannot control for the clearinghouse effect at organizations’ headquarters nor control for 
country-specific issues, my line of inquiry was mostly unrelated to these issues.  This 
study had access to applications from a large body of organizations operating in the CWD 
sector and provided insights for operations in post-conflict or transitional spaces.  The 
study is also the first investigation into the giving practices and assessment activities of 
the sector’s largest bilateral donor.   
Additionally, as has been noted, the dangerous nature of the work (and the 
dangerous places where the work is undertaken) provides legitimate concerns about 
disrupting standards and best practices.  Especially when discussing explosive clearance 
and remediation, the donor was focused on compliance with standards first and on 
tangential benefits afterward.  That said, the qualitative results of this study yielded 
interesting results where LTIAs are included in project implementation and improve 
service delivery.  The sector may benefit as evaluations are designed to be both a 
compliance measure and organizational development tool.  It is currently difficult for 
donor-government to understand how the leaders of CWD programs manage coordination 
and decision-making mechanisms.  A participatory design may therefore help with field-
driven LTIAs (Daniell, et. al., 2011).   
The present study identified two statistically significant organizational 
characteristics in modelling the inclusion of long-term impact assessment activities.  With 
both organizational size (as measured by the proposed project staff) and requested 
funding level, there is an underlying theoretical connection to professionalization, 
entrenchment, dependency, and accountability.  Leaders of organizations that are well-
funded or stably funded can turn their attention to building internal capacity, thinking 
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strategically and creatively, and pursuing organizational development objectives.  
Increased funding also results in a concomitant increase in scrutiny.  As we have seen, 
additional accountability can divert attention if leaders have not prepared their 
organizations or adopted a strategic vision for using data collected for continual learning 
and improvement. The organizational characteristics of funding and staff stand in for 
internal capacity—the larger an intervention (as measured by staff size or funding level), 
the more resources the organization feels it can or should request.  It also suggests an 
affinity between the donor-government and the organization, which leaders can leverage, 
and an opportunity to observe leader experience and style as well as leadership decision 
points.  These relationships are ripe for further study.   
While this study did not identify previous donor funding as statistically significant 
to the model, that in and of itself is revelatory.  In most of the theory development and 
contemporary discussion of donor leverage and NGO compliance, funding is a key 
component.  Donors opt to continue funding past recipients while NGOs are at pains to 
retain existing funders.  At least in the limited situation investigated by this study, it 
would appear that previous funding from a donor is not related to CWD operators’ 
compliance with donor-prompted change.  Additional variables related to context and 
capacity (such as organization age and scope of operations) may elucidate a more 
statistically significant relationship. 
 It is also important to consider issues with clearly and consistently establishing 
evaluation requirements and components (Scott, 1998).  That is to say, donor-
governments may need to devote time and resources not only to communicating 
requirements to applicants but also to internal professional development on the subject of 
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assessment and evaluation.  Donor-government leadership may need to take internal steps 
to improve understanding of and emphasis on measurement and accountability 
mechanisms as part of the competitive application evaluation process.  This study may 
help the donor-government exercise leadership in this regard, working collaboratively to 
align its strategic goals and objectives with an LTIA development process.  It is 
important to not overstate donor prerogative and stewardship of the CWD sector—
simplistic interpretations of donor-government dominance misunderstand NGO agency 
(Bryce, 2006).   
NGO leaders can develop clear and documented needs, and ensure change and 
innovation are successful (see Gilley, Dixon, & Gilley, 2008).  Additionally, they can 
cultivate deeper relationships with donors.  This could include information dissemination 
practices that bring the donor into more frequent or thorough communication with the 
implementing partner about the donor’s overall goals and strategic objectives as they 
relate to impact at the field level.  Additionally, larger funding amounts may mean more 
dollars are available to support LTIA activities (see discussion on dedicated teams and 
training as part of the qualitative strand).  Larger budgets may also indicate specific 
carve-outs for LTIA activities.  Finally, the quantitative analysis indicates that 
organizations both large and small may be devoting more time and resources to 
implementing long-term impact assessments.  The formal and informal relationships 
between donors and NGOs support each other (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010).  All of these 
trends may be explored in future studies.   
There are also a number of rich findings for the CWD community of practice.  
The first is that, of the applications that included LTIA activities, all included multiple 
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components to enhance the overall LTIA collection process.  Certainly, these elements 
were not equally substantial in and of themselves (a framework for LTIAs is a minimal 
effort and not all information sources were well-defined); however, the use of 
information dissemination suggests a deeper understanding of impact assessment value.  
A part of the community of practice has identified more robust monitoring and 
evaluation—it is the imperative for NGO leaders to activate capacity (if donors have not 
yet provided resources) and creativity (to capitalize on cost-effective measures).  Overall, 
these trends supplement the findings of the quantitative analysis and suggest an 
increasing level of professionalism in the field and an opportunity to enhance overall 
monitoring and evaluation of service delivery.  Additionally, the inclusion of certain 
structures and a focus on interacting with beneficiaries suggests a more careful approach 
to evaluation by implementing partners. 
 Any steps to integrate data collection, analysis, and reporting into operations 
represents movement beyond the thin International Mine Action Standards on monitoring 
and evaluation (and a sense that monitoring and evaluation distract from priorities like 
clearing land of explosive hazards).  The LTIA activities proposed included the use of 
qualitative and quantitative data as part of an integrated structure for continual learning.  
This includes the use of data collected for planning future operations.  Several proposals 
included full integration of the data collection and analysis into project delivery—starting 
with “real and perceived” impact data, the proposals moved to comparing data between 
project sites, developing key performance indicators, and promoting continual learning 
by implementing a feedback loop to operations in the field.  This kind of higher-level 
data analysis is common within the private sector and part of best practices; however, its 
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use in the technically challenging conventional weapons destruction field has been 
limited to-date.  It was especially encouraging to see the use of impact assessments to 
improve the quality of decision making that will influence future interventions.  Further, 
the proposal to engage with donors as part of information dissemination links 
organizational capacity and initiative with practice aspects of LTIA development—and 
substantiates the collaborative approach to reporting and storytelling. 
 Beyond the structure and focus of the LTIA data collection and analysis, the 
CWD community of practice can clearly benefit from some of the tools and time horizons 
established in the proposals this study considered.  The common recommendation of a 
six-month window for post-intervention impact analysis suggests a consensus among 
operators that at least preliminary benefits will appear in the field within six months of 
project delivery and that they can use this information in reporting.  Such a “long term” 
assessment window is short by comparison to other fields.  It may be sufficient time to 
the CWD community—it would be sufficient time to determine land use—but should be 
the subject of future research for validation.  This initial assessment window may allow 
for more proactive intervention design, more realistic budget development, and more 
thorough pre- and post-impact data collection.  Future work should include analysis and 
engagement between implementing partners and donors.  If implementing partners see 
service delivery benefits within six months, they may be able to advocate for longer 
periods of performance with the donor-government (or develop an intervention design 
that incorporates a previous project’s post-impact deliverables under the monitoring 
regime of a current project).  There may also be other limitations on NGO leaders’ 
attempts to suggest a time period—deployment constraints, security or logistical 
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considerations, proposal length restrictions, etc.  NGO leaders may also not be prepared 
to fully commit resources to an activity that is only, at present, optional.  Future iterations 
may also allow implementing partners to budget for specific tools needed to conduct the 
improved pre- and post-impact assessments.   
 Regarding the tools and implementation of LTIAs, there was a growing 
understanding that dedicated staff (and training for that staff) are necessary within the 
community of practice.  Leaders need to understand this capacity requirement and should 
make sufficient adjustments to strategies, planning, and resources.  Several organizations 
suggested assessment teams that liaise directly with impacted communities and service 
beneficiaries.  Identifying specific personnel would remove additional, potentially 
onerous, measurement requirements for operational or field staff with other (technically 
challenging or safety-related) responsibilities.  Although adding staff would require a 
concomitant increase in funding needs or the extension of periods of performance, the 
focus on data collection from direct beneficiaries responds to increased requirements 
from donors for accountability and performance data.  It also answers questions about 
overall project legitimacy, need, and impact—especially when structured as part of a 
process that not only produces data but also disseminates it to key stakeholders as part of 
strategic goals and objectives.    
Changes for the field.  Based on the results of this study, we can offer both practical and 
theoretical relevance for leaders and practitioners.  Within the CWD community of 
practice, the outcomes of this study can help refine the measurement and evaluation 
techniques taken by the community at large.  Multiple constituencies have competing and 
overlapping motivations for measuring services and growth (Campbell & Lambright, 
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2016).  This study should help refine and revise the International Mine Action Standards 
as well as the standard operating procedures for donor-governments.  It specifically has 
identified opportunities to expand the aperture of the IMAS beyond safety and 
compliance to a culture of information sharing, capacity building, and stakeholder 
engagement. As a member of the IMAS Review Board, the donor-government could help 
initiate a review of the standards for impact assessment and use the IMAS as a venue to 
engage implementing partners and stakeholders on these issues.  For professional peers, 
this study offers an important insight into the real-time relationship between a large donor 
and global implementing partners.  Additionally, it can help leaders and practitioners in 
donor-governments and in grant-seeking organizations understand the capacity 
requirements for the development, deployment, and marketing of long-term impact 
assessments in the CWD community of practice and international development sphere.  
As DePree (2004) wrote, “Leaders can delegate efficiency, but they must deal personally 
with effectiveness” (p. 8).   
 At an organizational level, there is considerable support in the literature for 
leaders to enable the talents and abilities of their subordinates (Kouzes & Posner, 2000).  
Rafferty and Griffin (2004) reexamined the transformational leadership model 
promulgated by Bass (1985) and found support for intellectual stimulation contributing to 
employees’ interest in problems and improvement of the solutions they created.  There 
was a positive relationship between intellectual stimulation and both affective 
commitment and continuance commitment to the firm.  This suggests that if leaders were 
to more positively involve their staff in responding to changes in donor support for LTIA 
activities—or donor requirements for assessment and accountability mechanisms more 
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broadly—they may positively stimulate employees’ idea generation and increase 
employees’ commitment to the organization more broadly.  This presents an opportunity 
for leaders to engage with the creativity and cost-consciousness of organizations while 
supporting organizational development. 
 Visualizing the CWD community of practice within the broader international 
development context highlights the current moment as an inflection point, one at which 
leaders in the field can capitalize on momentum to improve impact assessment activities 
and build lasting capacity.  Performance assessment, when adequately resourced, can 
improve management and strategic planning.  While international NGOs have shown 
initiative in developing practices for impact assessment (Kang, 2012; Rugh, 2004), the 
CWD community of practice and the International Mine Action Standards have focused 
on more traditional measures of outputs and outcomes.  NGOs play a critical role in 
disseminating management practices within civil societies, and leaders in CWD 
implementing organizations can have an outsized impact in this regard because of their 
direct contact with communities with less capacity and in transitional spaces.   
One of the more important opportunities for leaders in CWD organizations is to 
build on the momentum established by stakeholders calling for increased accountability 
through long-term impact assessments.  The literature and this study recognize that, while 
specific metrics or checklists may not exist to best deploy LTIAs, there is clear support 
for accountability regimes that offer multiple benefits—but only if they are deployed 
strategically in coordination with stakeholders.  Donor-governments are establishing the 
policy framework not only to prevent poor performance but also to promote stability 
(Batley & Mcgloughlin, 2010) and build capacities.  The literature sees NGOs as 
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strategic actors in their own right (Fogarty, 2011).  The critical component of that agency 
will be NGO leaders engaging with donor-governments to substantiate the value of 
impact assessments.  Practitioners can transform rote compliance into a deeper 
relationship where strategic leaders both in NGOs and donor-governments collaborate to 
best promote the long-term outcomes of their collective work.   
Further research.  Leadership is fundamentally tied to accountability, and it is the 
responsibility of leaders to create the framework in which they can demonstrate 
effectiveness.  As this study notes, the development and deployment of long-term impact 
assessment has the potential to make the most of access and expertise of NGO leaders 
while responding to outside pressure for monitoring and evaluation.  To capitalize on this 
access, NGO leaders must be aware of power dynamics with donors and be prepared to 
advocate for their organizations, expand capacity, plan strategically.  Future research 
should attempt to continue this line of investigation to see what additional organizational 
factors are associated with long-term impact assessment activities within this community 
of practice.   
As noted above, further research may also wish to focus on internal donor 
practices related to educating and training donor-government review panel members on 
the priorities and best practices for LTIA activities.  It is entirely possible that the 
community of practice did not respond to requests for long-term assessment 
methodologies at higher rates because the donor did not effectively or consistently 
communicate this priority.  Although this study could not rewrite large sections of the 
donor-government’s competitive announcements, the study’s results may spur the donor 
to more actively solicit both proposals for LTIA deployment and relevant variable data 
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for further analysis (for example, organization age, the experience of senior personnel, 
training plans, and organizations’ global operations). 
This study represents one of the few opportunities to engage the CWD community 
of practice with scholarly research.  To this point, most responses to donor-government 
interest in long-term assessments have been passive.  Practitioners can use this study to 
move the conversation in a more active direction.  Organizational capacity is critical for 
measurement and evaluations—leaders must create a workable environment, which may 
mean actively discussing measurement and evaluation activities with donor-governments.  
Future research will also have the opportunity to engage with NGOs’ global headquarters 
to better understand broader monitoring and evaluation schemes that support field-level 
practice across multiple donor accountability regimes.  NGO leaders can strategically use 
these conversations to continue internal learning while demonstrating value and overall 
impact.   
Further research should continue to pursue the analysis of qualitative data 
available in successful (and potentially unsuccessful) applications.  As we have seen, 
operators in the field are not completely intransigent to the development and deployment 
of LTIA activities—and incorporating them as part of ongoing service delivery.  Leaders 
at nongovernmental organizations may be able to encourage or incentivize such activities, 
and future research should also continue to pursue that course of investigation.  
Activating NGO creativity helps an organization cohere; so practitioners and NGO 
leaders can manage internal stakeholders and build capacity while responding to external 
requirements.  By balancing all of these factors with the need to deliver high-quality 
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services, leaders can pursue a participatory model of impact assessment development and 
deployment that satisfies donor-governments and builds internal competencies. 
This was the first significant review of funding practices by the world’s largest 
bilateral donor to CWD as well as an attempt to determine how the CWD community of 
practice might incorporate long-term impact assessments in its service delivery.  This 
study was unique because of the transitional and post-conflict spaces in which CWD 
activities take place.  Conventional weapons destruction activities are often the predicates 
to other stabilization and development activities.  Process improvements to these 
operations offer a blueprint for leaders to build indigenous capacity as a model for 
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The following is an example of the structure of the competitive announcements 
used by a donor-government for conventional weapons destruction.  Extraneous 
information has been removed to reduce clutter and better demonstrate the competitive 
announcement template.  
U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) 
 
Program Office:   Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
Opportunity Title: 2014 Survey and Clearance in Western Cambodia 
Announcement Type:   Request for Application (RFA)  
Funding Opportunity Number: 14.PMWRA.Cambodia.RFA 




The Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) is 
pleased to announce a competitive process for Fiscal Year 2014 funding for survey and 
clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Western Cambodia.  The overarching 
purpose is to reduce threats to civilians from ERW.  U.S.-based and foreign non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are eligible to apply.   Pending Fiscal Year 2014 
appropriations, the Office anticipates awarding at least one grant not to exceed $1.5 




The Office allocates foreign assistance based upon its mission statement: “To reduce the 
harmful worldwide effects of at-risk, illicitly-proliferated, and indiscriminately-used 
conventional weapons of war.”  
 
This solicitation announces the 2014 grant competitive process in which the Office 
requests applicants to submit a full Proposal for the above stated project title. Following a 
competitive review panel, the successful IP/IPs will be considered for funding.  
 
2014 PM/WRA GRANT COMPETITION OVERVIEW  
 
Pending the appropriation of fiscal year 2014 funds, the Office anticipates awarding 
grants for project periods of up to 12 months to organizations that are successful in the 
competitive review of their proposals.  Project start dates can be no earlier than 1 
September 2014. U.S.-based and foreign non-profit and non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) are eligible to submit RFA responses.  On a limited basis, for-profit organizations 
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may also be eligible to submit RFA responses; however, they may not take a profit from 
grant-funded activities. 
 
PM/WRA FUNDING PRIORITIES AND PROJECT EXAMPLES 
 
According to PM/WRA’s Strategic Plan 2014-2018, Conventional Weapons Destruction 
(CWD) Program is a set of activities that includes HMA, clearance of ERW, SA/LW 
destruction (to include at-risk munitions and MANPADS), stockpile and cache reduction, 
and PSSM.  CWD supports the advancement of peace and security throughout the world 
through the Department’s first foreign assistance objective, achieving peace and security, 
by reducing the likelihood of illicit trafficking of conventional arms and ammunition that 
fuel conflict and by responding to humanitarian disasters involving explosive hazards that 




With the understanding that projects are collaborative in nature, projects for this RFA 
will fall under the following category:   
 
1. Clearance of ERW includes: 
a.  Technical and non-technical survey of suspected hazardous areas 
b. clearance of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and landmines 
 
Project activities must be implemented in one or more Western Cambodia provinces. For 
the purposes of this RFA, Western Cambodia provinces include the following: 
Battambang, Pursat, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, and Siem Reap.  
    
APPLICANT/ORGANIZATION CRITERIA 
 
U.S.-based and foreign NGOs, and institutions of higher education are eligible to apply.  
Some projects may be accomplished by USG implementers through Interagency 
Agreement.  For-profit organizations, including small and disadvantaged businesses, may 
apply, but such organizations may not take a profit from PM/WRA funded-activities.  
Foreign governments are not eligible to apply but governments may be beneficiaries of 
funded programs, provided that funding does not pay salaries of government agency 
personnel and that such assistance is not restricted by U.S. law or policy.  
 
Organizations should have demonstrated experience administering successful CWD 
projects, preferably in the target country and/or region, humanitarian demining, weapons 
destruction, survivors’ assistance, and in similarly challenging security environments. 
 
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPOSAL SUBMISSIONS 
 
All PROPOSALS will be screened to determine whether they meet the Technical 
Requirements listed below.  Proposals that do not meet the Technical Requirements will 
not be reviewed for funding.   




Technical Requirements: Proposal Applications MUST include a twelve-page 
proposal. 
 
1. FULL Proposal and Narrative to include budget breakdown, cost/m2/brief IP 
historical background. 
2. FULL Detailed Budget in Excel as attached Annex to the Proposal. 
3. The SF-424 and SF-424B forms (online through Grantsolutions.gov) 
4. Project Hazard list as per Project Title Documentation. 
5. Full Organizational Structure 
6. Description of how the project meets PM/WRA priorities or the RFA 
announcement  
7. Project description, including goals and objectives, and duration. (To include 
methodology, initial work plan, proposed summer/winter work plans if required). 
8. Project description of activities conducted by sub-grantees and/or local partners 
(if using a sub-grantee).  The total costs should be outlined under the Contracting 
in the Detailed Budget.  The actual Subaward/Contract budget must be attached to 
the application as an attachment.  If the subaward operator or budget are unknown 
at this time the budgets of the subawards/ subgrantees must be approved by the 
Grants Officer before any pass through costs are allowed. 
9. Proof of Cambodian Operational and Organizational accreditation certification. 
10. Inventory of proposed DOS project equipment and/or loan agreement for DOS 
project equipment.  
11. Prior year audit submission. 
 
Detailed Budget: 
12. Provide a detailed line item budget which breaks-down all proposed costs in U.S. 
Dollars.  If cost sharing is offered, include a column for the proposed amount of 
cost share.  
 
Optional Impact Assessment Component 
 
At their discretion, applicants may choose to address the measurement of their proposed 
project’s long-term impacts.  This component must go beyond standard reporting metrics 
on the project’s immediate outputs and outcomes, and must outline a long-term impact 
assessment methodology that demonstrates the extent to which long-term change has 
occurred.  While the applicant will design the specifics of the impact assessment plan, it 
should include the following components: 
 
▪ Impact assessment indicators:  The applicant should develop impact 
assessment indicators that measure the extent to which the project has 
contributed to change in the project community, population, or area.  
Successful applications will include a list of long-term impact assessment 
indicators on which data will be collected. 
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▪ Data collection: The impact assessment plan should include a baseline 
assessment phase.  Where project activities prevent baseline data collection, 
the applicant can outline steps taken to establish baseline information on the 
project. The impact assessment plan must include a data collection phase 
after the conclusion of the project.  Baseline data must be compared to final 
data to demonstrate the extent to which change occurred in the project 
community, population, or area.  Data collected must be in addition to the 
standard monitoring and evaluation metrics that are to be collected during 
the project’s implementation.  
 
It will be the responsibility of the applicant to determine the appropriate data collection 
methods for their impact assessment.  Proposals should include drafts of any data 
collection instruments to be used.  While the results of the impact assessment should be 
presented in the award recipient’s final report, all primary data must be maintained by the 
award recipient for a minimum of three years.  
 
As long-term impact assessments are additional to standard grant reporting, 
PM/WRA may make additional funding available to carry out impact assessments.  
Proposal budgets should include an impact assessment line item if applicants 
choose to address this additional component.  In some cases, long-term impact data 
will be collected and submitted after the grant’s period of performance has been 
completed.  The grantee is allowed to budget associated costs into the grant 
accordingly within the impact assessment line item.  Submission of the report must 
be complete within 18 months after the end of the period of performance.  Proposals 
that do not address this additional component will not be penalized during the 
application review process.  Two additional pages will be allowed beyond the 
standard proposal page limit for description of the optional impact assessment plan. 
 
THE COMPETITIVE REVIEW PROCESS 
 
This solicitation will enable the Office to identify organizations that are interested in and 
capable of implementing CWD projects in Cambodia. 
 
RFA submissions first will be screened to determine whether they meet the technical 
requirements stated in this announcement.  Applicants must pay attention to and should 
abide by the specified technical requirements. Submissions that do not meet the technical 
review requirements will not be read or considered for funding.  
 
Those Submissions that pass the technical review will be reviewed and rated by a panel 
comprised of individuals with knowledge and experience in CWD programming and 
regional expertise.  The assessment will be based on how well the proposed project meets 
the priorities outlined in this announcement and addresses the content outlined in the 
Format and Content section above.   Panel results will consider bilateral, regional, and 
global factors, as well as any policies, restrictions, or limitations on U.S assistance that 
may apply to each country or region involved.  Final approval and Congressional 
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Notification must take place before each grant, cooperative agreement, or Interagency 
Agreement is awarded.  
 
DEADLINE AND SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS 
 
All RFAs must be submitted via www.grantsolutions.gov OR www.grants.gov by 5:00 
p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on Friday, July 18 at 5:00.  PM/WRA will not 
accept proposals submitted via email, fax, the postal system, or delivery companies or 
couriers.  Applicants may submit more than one application; however, each application 
should be submitted only once.  
 
Applicants are strongly encouraged to initiate electronic applications early in the 
application development process, and to submit early on the due date or before.  This will 
aid in addressing any problems with submissions prior to the application deadline.  No 
exceptions will be made for organizations that have not completed the necessary steps to 




This call for Statements of Interest will appear on www.grantsolutions.gov and 
www.grants.gov. 
 
Anticipated Time to Award:  The Office will work to execute grant awards to 
successful applicants pending Congressional authorization of funds in Fiscal Year 2014. 
 
Reporting and Monitoring Requirements:  Applicants selected for an award must meet 
the following reporting and policy requirements: 
 
1. Reporting Requirements:  Grantees are required to submit semi-annual program 
progress reports and quarterly financial reports throughout the project period and 
final reports 90 days after the close of the project period.  Access to funds may be 
suspended if reports are late or incomplete. 
 
2. Grant Monitoring:  The Office places emphasis on monitoring and evaluation of 
all funded projects.  Grantees should expect to have their programs visited and 
reviewed by a grants and/or programs officer.  On-site reviews include assessment 











The following is the language on optional long-term impact assessment measures 
included in some of the notices of funding availability (competitive announcements) 
released by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in the U.S. 
Department of State. 
 
Optional Impact Assessment Component   
 
At their discretion, applicants may choose to address the measurement of their proposed 
project’s long-term impacts.  This component must go beyond standard reporting metrics 
on the project’s immediate outputs and outcomes, and must outline a long-term impact 
assessment methodology that demonstrates the extent to which long-term change has 
occurred.  While the applicant will design the specifics of the impact assessment plan, it 
should include the following components: 
 
▪ Impact assessment indicators:  The applicant should develop impact 
assessment indicators that measure the extent to which the project has 
contributed to change in the project community, population, or area.  
Successful applications will include a list of long-term impact assessment 
indicators on which data will be collected. 
 
▪ Data collection: The impact assessment plan should include a baseline 
assessment phase.  Where project activities prevent baseline data collection, 
the applicant can outline steps taken to establish baseline information on the 
project. The impact assessment plan must include a data collection phase 
after the conclusion of the project.  Baseline data must be compared to final 
data to demonstrate the extent to which change occurred in the project 
community, population, or area.  Data collected must be in addition to the 
standard monitoring and evaluation metrics that are to be collected during 
the project’s implementation.  
 
It will be the responsibility of the applicant to determine the appropriate data collection 
methods for their impact assessment.  Applications should include drafts of any data 
collection instruments to be used.  While the results of the impact assessment should be 
presented in the award recipient’s final report, all primary data must be maintained by the 
award recipient for a minimum of three years.  
 
As long-term impact assessments are additional to standard grant reporting, 
PM/WRA may make additional funding available to carry out impact assessments.  
Proposal budgets should include an impact assessment line item if applicants 
choose to address this additional component.  In some cases, long-term impact data 
will be collected and submitted after the grant’s period of performance has been 
completed.  The grantee is allowed to budget associated costs into the grant 
accordingly within the impact assessment line item.  Submission of the report must 
be complete within 18 months after the end of the period of performance.  
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Applications that do not address this additional component will not be penalized 
during the application review process.  Two additional pages will be allowed 
beyond the standard proposal page limit for description of the optional impact 
assessment plan. 
